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ABSTRACT 
Changes in water use patterns are an inevitable consequence 
of relentless social transformations taking place. Especially where 
waters have been fully appropriated, the needs of a dynamic society 
must be met through transfers in water ownership. Yet, there are a 
variety of factors that may operate as impediments to the shifting of 
water according to social preferences as expressed through water 
markets. As a mechanism for facilitating water transfers, exchanges, 
or rentals, the concept of "water banking" and "water brokering" may 
be fruitful. This report appraises the potential for initiating and 
operating such a service within the legal, institutional, and orga-
nizational framework prevailing in Utah. 
Questions addressed are: What are the special characteristics 
of water rights and water right owners that constitute important 
elements of the market arena? How would a banking and/or brokering 
service effectively deal with the mix of marketable water right 
equities ranging from the "general corporate right" (exercised in 
satisfying an unlimited variety of individual uses at the pleasure of 
the corporation, Le. municipality, conservancy district, etc.); the 
individual proportion or "share" of a mutually owned right; to the 
individually owned water right? How would the water banking operation 
be coordinated with the State Engineer who must approve all changes in 
use? What are the organizational alternatives for establishing a 
water bank? Should such a service be sponsored and operated as a 
public or private activity? What are the legal considerations that 
must be addressed? Are there constitutional, statutory, or procedural 
considerations that seriously constrain the operation of a water 
banking/brokering service? Can such a service be made to complement 
present institutional structures and whatever forms of banking and 
brokering they may currently provide? What are the economic consid-
erations in the creation of a water banking/brokering service? 
It is concluded that a water bank could be effective in facili-
tating cost-effective and resource efficient matchups of buyers and 
sellers of water. There are no constitutional, statutory, or regula-
tive elements in Utah water administration that would seriously hinder 
the operation of a water banking/brokering system. However, there are 
some institutional peculiarities and debt encumbrances that may limit 
the market potential of particular water right equities. The protec-
tion of third party interests to any water rights transact ion is a 
central consideration in arranging water transfers, exchanges, or 
rentals. Therefore, the water bank must be staffed by individuals 
having technical understanding of the hydrologic and legal impacts 
and the economic externali ties that accompany particular water use 
changes. 
An appraisal of existing Utah organizations capable of assuming 
a water banking/brokering service suggest the Office of the State 
Engineer (public) and the Utah Water Users Association (private) as 
the two most likely candidates. It is recommended that the evaluation 
of these two organizations now be made in more detail with respect to 
suitability of the new banking/brokering service to basic mission, 
current operating policies and programs, organizational structure, and 
fiscal and budgetary framework. Decision to initiate the concept 
should probably begin with a limited level of service, adding more 
comprehensive and more professional elements as justified by operating 
experience. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Water Right - The entitlement to use surface 
or underground water for a beneficial 
purpose as evidenced by a certificate 
of appropriation, by a judicial decree, 
or by diligence claims. May be trans-
ferred by deed in substantially the 
same manner as real estate. May be 
represented by shares of stock in a 
corporation. 
Water Appropriation - The process whereby 
unappropriated public waters of a 
state are acquired for private use 
upon application to the State Engineer. 
The appropriation must be for some 
useful or beneficial purpose, and 
appropriators have priority among 
themselves according to the dates of 
their respective appropriations. 
Proposed use of the applicant must not 
impair existing rights, interfere with 
more beneficial uses, nor prove detri-
mental to the public welfare. The 
prosposed plan of use must demonstrate 
economic and financial feasibility. 
Equity Interest in Water - A legal term for 
ownership or partial ownership in a 
water right. 
R~!~_Banking - Connotes a proprietory 
management of a "pool" of water equities 
with disgressionary authority to accept 
individual "deposits" of water entitle-
ment and make individual lease or pur-
chase arrangements for waters "held 
in trust." Managing a "stock" of 
water to the satisfaction of individual 
water borrowers and lenders or buyers 
and sellers of equity interests. 
Water Brokering Connotes a negotiated 
transferring of a specific property 
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right between two ~r more parties. 
Requires that particular buyers and 
sellers, lessors or lessees, both 
agree to the terms of the transfer. 
Broker has no proprietory control 
over water right'. eqUities involved 
but serves as a go-between. 
Water Allocation - The distribution of water 
use entitlements among applicants under 
the prior appropriation doctrine and 
through the appropriation process. Al-
locations continue over time according 
to economic market forces subject to 
State Engineer tests of beneficial use, 
impairment of existing rights, public 
interest, etc. 
Hydrologic Externalities - Refers to the 
changes in flow characteristics that 
result external to the site where 
a particular change in water use or 
management is initiated. Because 
of the interconnection of all surface 
and subsurface waters of a river baSin, 
moving in a downhill direction, the 
effects of diversion, regulation, 
or treatment at a particular point are 
transmitted into flow characteristics 
at downstream locations. The projection 
of hydrologic externali ties are the 
basis for determining the impact on 
existing water rights reSUlting from any 
proposed change in water use. 
Conditioning Costs - Costs commonly entailed 
in shifting water from one use to 
another in addit ion to the purchase 
price of the water right itself. In 
converting from one use to another the 
quality, quantity, timing, and ~ocation­
a1 characteristics may need modification 
or conditioning to make them conform to 
requirements of the new use. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Social Dynamics and Water Reallocation 
Economic and social change give rise to 
changes in water supply and use patterns. 
New uses with different quantity, quality, 
timing, and location requirements entail 
modification/expansion of delivery systems 
and/or transfers, shifts, or exchanges in 
resource ownership. When fully appropriated 
in a socially dynamic environment, water can 
continue to serve its role as an essential 
ingredient or catalyst in the attainment of 
social well-being goals only if it is con-
vertible or transferable to uses according 
to contemporary priorities. Thus, providing 
an easy and advantageous transfer of water to 
emerging higher valued uses is essential lest 
water become limiting to the achievement of 
economic and social goals. In general, the 
market is the process by which water trans-
fers are accomplished. 
A variety of legal and institutional 
factors are generally perceived to impede the 
transfer of water through market forces. 
Similarly, the peculiarities of the water 
marketing arena and possible weaknesses in 
marketing mechanisms have been identified as 
explanations of sluggishness in water trans-
fers to a steadily growing;. array of higher 
value use.rs and uses. (1) The concept of 
"water banking" and "water brokering" offers 
potential for improving the water marketing 
function by providing a centralized source of 
information about specific water availability 
and specific water needs such that market 
participants have better recognition of 
options available. Such an informational 
repository presumably would also provide a 
better derivation of the social value of 
water. 
For any given water rights transaction, 
private legal or engineering advice may be 
sought by one or both parties to provide 
assurance that the transaction is physically 
sound and legally correct. However, such aid 
is usually without the complete informational 
base to expose the full array of alternate 
supply options and provide advice concerning 
selection of the one best suited to the 
expressed need. Hence, a water brokering 
service may be a useful device for assembling 
information about water availability and 
water need and making such information 
broadly available for the use of those 
wanting to buy, sell, or rent water. 
(1) Ange ledes, Sort iros, and Bugene Bardach. 
Water Banking: How to Stop Wasting Agricultural 
Water. Institute for Contemporary Studies, San 
Francisco, Calif. 1978. 
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Water law in Utah is suffiCiently 
flexible to permit orderly shifts of water 
from one use to another. Subject to the 
administrative controls of the State Engi-
neer, water rights can be bought and sold to 
achieve water ·reallocations among competing 
demands. Each buyer makes his own canvas of 
potential sources of supply and proceeds to 
negotiate the terms of procurement for the 
supply believed to be most readily adapted to 
the intended use. The State Engineer 
must approve any resulting wa·ter rights 
transfers and is thus in contact with buyers 
and sellers of water providing a public 
"water brokering" service of sorts. However, 
the State Engineer's role in most water 
transactions is more that of a "referee" than 
that of an "arranger" such as a realtor or 
broker of real estate. His primary concern 
is to ascertain the hydrologic and legal 
consequences of any proposed transfer so that 
potential conflicts between and among 
water right holders can be mitigated before 
the transfer takes place. Buyers and sellers 
of water generally do not view the State 
Engineer as an informational storehouse about 
water markets. The State Engineer is general-
ly not directly involved in the initial 
private negotiations between buyers and 
sellers. He examines transfer agreements 
between willing buyers and sellers to insure 
conformity to legal requirements and prevail-
ing administrative policy and procedure once 
an official change application is submitted. 
He hears and considers comments and protests 
from all parties who have an interest or feel 
their water rights may be adversely affected 
by a proposed water transfer. However, 
as a quasi-judicial officer, the State 
Engineer does not participate directly in the 
water marketing process. 
Water Banking/Brokering as a Means 
of Expediting Water Transfers 
The term water banking/brokering, as 
employed in this study, represents a cen-
tralized mechanism for expediting the trans-
fer of equity interests in water. Many 
different kinds of equity transfer and equity 
exchange situations would be included in this 
concept. 
The "water bank ing" concept would apply 
where there exists a "proprietorship" over a 
water "pool." For example, if assets or 
negotiables of the bank consist of subscrip-
tions for water deliveries, .ith the pro-
prietorship having discretionary authority to 
supply all kinds of users within its corpo-
rate boundaries, then the operation fits the 
description of a water bank. Such operating 
flexibility, constrained only by the physical 
limitations of storing and conveying water to 
the satisfaction of customers within its 
operating territory, should allow subscribers 
to place entitlements on deposit for possible 
use by others who can afford the "rental 
fee. II Individual lessors and lessees would 
need only deal with the bank. The subscrip-
t ions themselves and obligat ions associated 
with them could remain intact. However, the 
bank might repossess the subscription 
outright if a particular subscriber has 
outlived its need. The important distin-
guishing feature of a water bank would be 
that it manage a "stock" of water dealing 
wi th both borrowers and lenders, buyers and 
sellers, separately and individually. 
Managing a kind of corporate water supply 
would offer flexibility to tailor amounts and 
locations of supply according to market 
demand. Since the stock of water under the 
jurisdiction of the proprietor is not inter-
nally encumbered in the transfer process by 
constraints on the place and nature of use 
and point of diversion as with individual 
water rights, it would be p.ossible to operate 
in a banking mode. Tests of beneficial use, 
forfeiture, and third party impacts that 
pertain to transfers of the right itself are 
not operative for transfers taking place 
internal to a corporate right. 
Water brokering, on the other hand, 
connotes a negotiated transfer of a well 
defined property right between two or more 
parties. The broker is not a participant in 
the transaction and buyers and sellers 
must both be satisfied with terms or the 
transrer-will not take place. Unlike the 
situation where individual users are supplied 
out of a single large water right in the name 
of the corporate entity, transactions regard-
ing individual water rights cannot avoid 
considerations of third party impacts to the 
transaction. 
In actual practice, there are large 
numbers of individual rights interspersed 
throughout the domain of larger corporate 
water supplying entities (such as water 
conservancy districts). While the brokering 
concept could be applied quite generally 
throughout regions and the state as a whole, 
the banking operation would be limited to 
situations where a proprietorship opportunity 
exists. The basic distinction between water 
banking and water brokering lies in the 
proprietorship feature. Unless an entity has 
some entrepreneurial authority over a supply 
serving large numbers and varieties of retail 
users it could not operate as a water bank in 
the sense that the term is used in this 
study. While it is necessary to keep in mind 
the differences between water banking and 
water brokering, it is also necessary to 
recognize that any given region in Utah will 
contain a mix of banking and brokering 
opportunities. Therefore, much of the 
discussion pertains to either or both of the 
concepts and distinctions are not rigorously 
emphasized. 
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Water transfers can be expedited by 
making water availabilities more generally 
visible to prospective buyers, providing 
analytic reviews and assurances, and advising 
on physical and legal preconditions to be met 
before needed official approval of any 
proposed transfer is obtained. As a central 
clearinghouse of information about water 
avai labi li ty and water need or demand, a 
water bank or broker may help in organizing 
water rights "packages" to meet specifically 
expressed needs. 
The justification for water banking/ 
broker ing services must be found in demon-
strated advantage to the public in 1) 
increasing the level of information and 
awareness between entities desiring to 
purchase or sell water interests; 2) re-
ducing the transfer costs involved in 
such water interest transfers (i. e., legal 
fees, search costs, etc.); 3) fostering a 
better accommodation of public interest 
criteria and standards so that the social 
utility of water use is upgraded in each 
transaction with lessened likelihood of 
speculative or monopolistic advantage at 
public expense or subsidy; and 4) utilizing 
the transfer process to correct existing 
imperfections in older water rights awards to 
bring their definitions in line with present 
standards of description and water duty. 
Therefore, a primary role of a water banking/ 
brokering service would be to provide, a 
"brokering" service for water equities 
somewhat analogous to a realtor in arrang-
ing transfers of real estate equities. 
Obviously, a water banking/brokerage 
function would find more application in areas 
of rapid demographic transition (urbanizing 
areas). In isolated and stable agricultural 
areas where water users have a close ac-
quaintenship with one another and where 
water ownership transfers can only occur 
between shareholders on an intra-company 
basis, a regional or statewide water banking 
system would be of limited value. In such 
situations, a bank (broker) could not mate-
rially improve the awareness of potential 
buyers and sellers as to availability and 
need. Nor could a centralized bank do much 
to lessen the costs of making an intra-
company water rights transaction. On the 
other hand, a large new enterprise (i.e., 
energy development) proposing to locate in an 
otherwise water stable area, may induce very 
substantial, complex, and far reaching 
economic, social, or environmental impacts 
requiring utilization of a range of services 
a water bank/broker could provide. Such 
service might be of advantage not only to· the 
immediate and affected parties, but to the 
entire state as well. For episodic changes 
in water use, wherever proposed, all parties 
to a water transaction may benefit from the 
services of a water bank operated in close 
liaison with the Office of the State Engineer 
and the Division of Water Resources. 
It is quite possible that a banking 
service, formally and appropriately coordi-
nated with the Office of the State Engineer, 
could keep that office cont inuously updated 
regarding stirrings in the water market. 
Current knowledge of interest in buying or 
selling water could provide the State Engi-
neer (and the state in general) with some 
advance indication of water transfer poten-
t ials with which he may ultimately have to 
deal. The bank could serve a useful purpose 
in alerting parties to a transaction early in 
the negotiating stage of conditions that must 
be met for the transfer to be acceptable to 
the State Engineer. Where the State Engineer 
is asked to approve a water rights transfer 
whose terms have been painstakingly worked 
out between the part ies involved but which 
turns out not to meet the necessary con-
ditions for State Engineer approval, a 
painful adjustment may be imposed upon the 
negotiators. 
There appears to be some opportunity to 
make short term rentals of "surplus" water 
through the auspices of a water bank/broker. 
Grow,ing communities, for example, must plan 
and build ahead of actual water needs. 
Communities normally strive to provide ample 
supplies so as to minimize the necessity of 
imposing use restrictions while awaiting 
completion of system enlargements. For 
example, through the operation of the Metro-
politan Water District, Salt Lake City has 
been able to provide water to county users 
until such time as supplies are needed for 
city purposes. Some major water using 
industries require a firm water supply so 
that operations will not be jeopardized 
during drought periods. Consequently, they 
hedge against hydrologic variations and 
hydraulic system limitations by acquiring 
a water supply whose flow in extremely dry 
years will be sufficient to meet normal 
needs. Most water entitlements under such 
water rights would be commonly in excess of 
actual need and the "surplus" water could be 
rented most years--certainly on an inter-
ruptible basis. While such water may have a 
relatively low rental value, the bank/broker 
service may be instrumental in placing 
this "insurance" water in more economically 
productive interim use than may otherwise be 
possible without such a service. 
Clearly, the value of a water banking/ 
brokerage service must be measured in terms 
of profit in the eyes of clients who employ 
the service. Generally, bringing more buyers 
and sellers into a centralized "auction" 
should not only reduce the individual 
cost to search out prospective buyers or 
sellers but also increase the likelihood of 
finding the "highest bidder." For the 
purchaser, a centralized broker service 
should provide a greater array of supply 
options from which to choose, thereby im-
proving the chances for obtaining the 
most cost-effective solution to a water 
acquisition problem. 
Specialized personnel and possession of 
a large informational base would tend to 
reduce costs associated with completing a 
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water transaction. Certification of the 
validity of the water right being conveyed 
(similar to title insurance in real estate 
transactions) might be provided as a part of 
a banking/brokering service. Uncertainty 
of validity or status of a water right 
of times creates major delay to a potential 
transfer. 
In many instances, a major obstacle to 
the expeditious transfer of a water right 
is the lack of knowledge of who buyers and 
sellers are and the high information costs 
associated with obtaining this market knowl-
edge. This lack of centralized source of 
information on water transactions is pain-
fully evident to a large enterprise that must 
accumulate water from numerous individual 
sources in order to obtain its required 
supply. Having a large information base 
about buyers and sellers of water, water 
brokerage would be well-suited for putting 
together "packages" of water rights to suit 
specific needs of buyers, or conversely, for 
dispursing a large water ri.ht among a 
disaggregated set of users. Industrial or 
commercial enterprises, unfamiliar with water 
markets and the complexities of making water 
right transfers, may find the services of a 
bank/broker system most useful. Net effi-
ciency in water resource and capital utiliza-
tion should then be increased through the 
ability of the service to achieve improved 
matchups between water availability and water 
need. 
In short, if a water banking/brokerage 
service could foster a more cost-effective 
and resource efficient matchup between 
buyers and sellers of water; and lessen 
market distortions that occasionally occur 
when information about supply options and 
user potentials is limited; the water bank 
would fill an important void. In addition, 
real value to the entire state in the form of 
increased social benefit resulting from more 
"optimum" transfers would result if the 
brokerage system facilitated more system-
atic consideration of the public interest 
issues involved in transfers. 
Special Characteristics of Water 
Rights and the Market Arena 
Since water rights are treated much as 
real property under the Utah law of appro-
priation, their transfer or exchange can be 
fitted into the conceptual construct of water 
banking and brokering as described above. 
However, there are some very significant dif-
ferences related to physical mobility, third 
party impacts, and public interest concerns 
pertaining to transfers of a "resource in 
common" that temper the comparison with 
other highly liquid property transactions 
(money, commodities, stocks, etc.) These 
factors must be carefully considered in 
analyzing the operation of a water banking/ 
brokering service. 
A water right embodies a "commodity" 
dimension (like a bushel of wheat or a 
kilowatt of electricity) but it also (gener-
ally) connotes a continuing entitlement to 
draw on the common supply in perpetuity. 
Thus, it is not just the corpus of the water 
that is bartered in a water market. Singular 
focus on the commodi ty dimension has led to 
common allegations that water pricing is 
wrongly outside the market framework. If 
this were true, the idea of a water banking/ 
brokerage service would be seriously flawed. 
I t is the legally protected water use right 
that justifies long term investment in the 
various enterprises to which water is essen-
tial. Investment costs (incurred on the 
basis of long time certainty of a water 
supply and required for placing water in 
beneficial use) become integral parts of 
the water rights value. Succeeding transfers 
of water rights necessarily include original 
and subsequent nonseparable development 
capital values. When all the investments 
which have productive value and marketability 
only so long as water is available are 
properly capitalized into the transfer price 
of a water right, then water transfers really 
do occur in a market arena. Thus, water 
transactions do fit the general property 
construct and conceptual framework to which a 
banking/brokerage function could operate. 
In emphasizing the notion that water 
rights transfers do conform to market prin-
ciples when properly perceived, mention 
should be made of one other feature of water 
right ownership that complicates the transfer 
process somewhat. Individual water rights 
differ greatly in terms of the kinds of use 
allowed, amounts of water involved, etc. 
Some water rights are identified with indi-
vidual users. Others are identified with a 
"corporate" entity which, in turn, allocates 
water to individual users within the corpora-
tion giving them valid proportional entitle-
ments to the corporate right. However, these 
individual portions are not a matter of 
4 
record with the the State Engineer--only the 
corporate body. The State Engineer is not 
generally a party to intracompany trans fers 
of equity interest. Yet these "internal" 
transfers are common and may wish to employ 
the services of a bank or broker to expedite 
the transaction. Thus, a banking/brokering 
system would have to be knowledgeable about 
these "hierarchical" differences among 
water rights; appreciate how they affect 
the resolution with which the State Engineer 
"sees" the impacts of water transfers within 
the framework of a given water right (and 
hence the necessity of his permission to make 
a transfer); and understand how the operating 
latitude of the banking/brokering service may 
be influenced by these differences. 
Purpose and Scope of Analyses 
This study examines some significant 
physical, legal, institutional, economic, 
organizational, and operational elements that 
need to be considered in determining whether 
or not a water banking/brokerage service 
should be established in Utah. The intent is 
to make an objective assessment of how a 
banking/brokering system would have to fit 
within existing legal and institutional 
structures. The specific objectives are to 
1) identify any legal-institutional impedi-
ments which would prevent or severely 
limit implementation of a water banking/ 
brokerage system in Utah; 2) within the 
limitations imposed by such impediments (or 
the possible removal of them) identify 
possible systems of water banking to include 
organizational options and administrative 
composition to manage such a service; and 3) 
identify existing organizations which either 
have, or could readily adopt, those operating 
attributes that would appear to be essential 
for successfully sustaining the water bank-
ing/brokering purpose. 
II. OPERATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The operat ional, organizat ional, and 
administrative framework would be pivotal in 
the ultimate success or failure of a water 
banking/brokerage service. If the service is 
to achieve and maintain the focus and incen-
t ive for voluntary negotiat ions between 
willing buyers and sellers, its operating 
interactions with 1) state water administra-
tors, managers, and planners; 2) the hierar-
chy of local water management organizations; 
and 3) individual appropriators would have to 
be uniformly consistent and mutually con-
structive. Perhaps a discussion of the op-
erational, administrative, and organizational 
considerations should proceed from an outline 
of some of the important attributes or 
operating criteria of a water bank, such as: 
1. 
2. 
Utilization of services should be 
voluntary •. 
Operating policies and procedures 
should be consistent and compatible 
with existing statutes governing 
the transfer and change in use of 
water. 
3. Functions and authorities should 
be compatible with, and complemen-
tary to, those of relevant state 
agencies. 
4. The operation of the bank should re-
sult in a net positive social bene-
fit (benefits greater than costs of 
providing service). 
5. The bank should be free from any en-
cumbrances or commitments that could 
compromise objectivity in assisting 
clientele. 
6. The bank should have no resp'onsi-
bility or authority for formulating 
state water policy (procedural 
emphasis) • 
7. There must be adequate public ac-
countability in the operation of the 
bank. 
8. There must be adequate fiscal ac-
countability in the operation of the 
bank. 
9. The bank should have a mutually 
constructive operating interaction 
with existing water management and 
water service organizations. 
10. Service should apply to all kinds of 
recognized beneficial uses and per-
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tain to all sources of supply 
(groundwater, surface, etc.). 
11. Services should be available on a 
statewide basis. 
If the above requirements are valid, it 
is clear that a banking/brokerage service 
should not be expected to replace or disrupt 
the free operation of markets for water. On 
the contrary, the bank would need to function 
so as to facilitate or supplement the normal 
functioning of the market process. Authori-
ties and operat ing rules of the bank would 
have to mesh and synchronize with those of 
the State Engineer. There would have to be 
adequate political, legal, fiscal, and 
professional accountability in the operation 
of the banking service. This chapter 
examines some of the important operational, 
administrative, and organizational issues re-
lating to a water banking/brokerage service. 
Operational Considerations 
Activities and Services 
The primary activity of a water bank in 
Utah would be in providing information needed 
by buyers and sellers of equity interests in 
water rights so that transfers could be 
expedited. Thus, the operation of the 
bank/broker service would center around the 
transfer process, aiming to make transactions 
as efficient and orderly as possible. 
In addition to facilitating transfers of 
equity interests in water, a bank may be a 
useful mechanism to expedite exchanges of 
equity interests, where clients would be 
benefited in so doing. Also, the bank might 
become a useful device in helping clients 
devise ways to integrate the use of storage 
rights and direct flow rights and to "pack-
age" rights in ways to coordinate the use 
of surface and groundwater rights. 
Often water transactions are too com-
plicated for buyers and sellers to work out 
wi thout ass istance. A knowledgeable water 
banking entity accustomed to the water 
negotiating process, may be able to mediate 
and counsel in the development of coordinated 
plans which upgrade the value of water rights 
and the efficiency of water service among 
users. A bank ing/broker age sys tern lack ing 
any vested or direct equity interests in the 
negotiations would be especially effec-
tive in expediting water transfers that 
involve complex physical and ownership 
situations. 
While the above activities relate 
more to the brokering side, the service 
might acquire water rights in its own name 
which it could hold in trust for reallotment 
through sales or subscriptions. Under 
this kind of operation it may be possible 
to evaluate the water right in the resale 
process and correct defects of ambiguities 
that might otherwise continue to cloud 
the validity in terms of relative standing 
with other water rights in the system. Also, 
the State Engineer might find it easier to 
impose public interest conditions in ap-
proving water transfers out of public trust 
ownership than if the transfer is being 
negotiated between individual parties with 
strong vested interest concerns. Any holding 
of water rights in trust would have to be 
consistent with the present "banking" or 
"holding" of approved filings practiced by 
the State Water Resources Board and the 
Water and Power Resources Service (formerly 
the Bureau of Reclamation). It may be 
plausible for a state authorized banking/ 
brokerage system to integrate such holdings 
into its more generali~ed operation. On the 
other hand, there would be less vulnerability 
to criticism about regulating or manipulating 
water markets to suit its own ends if the 
bank served strictly as an arranger in water 
transfers between negotiating parties and not 
as a participant in the market itself. 
The most significant role of a water 
banking/broking entity might be that of a 
realtor who obtains listings of water rights 
available for sale or lease to prospective 
purchasers or lessees. The entity might 
also find it practical and feasible to serve 
as a broker of water right options. During 
the period the bank/broker held an option or 
a listing of water to be purchased or sold, 
the owner could, of course, continue to 
use the water. As with a land realtor, the 
water realtor would not become an owner of 
any water right interest. Where the role is 
pr imari ly a market faci li tator and not a 
market participant, the buyer and seller 
determine the price and other conditions of 
the transaction. 
Candidates to Provide a Banking/ 
Brokering Service 
Under the current legal framework for 
water rights ownership and transfer in Utah, 
entities which have legal standing as "per-
sons" and are entitled to appropriate water, 
and who would thus represent the potential 
water banking clientele, are identified as 
follows (see Section 73-3 of the Utah Water 
Code) : 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
Individual persons or associations 
of persons 
Nonprofit corporations 
Cities and towns 
Metropolitan Water Districts 
Municipal Improvement Districts 
County Improvement Districts 
Special Service Districts 
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h. Irrigation Districts 
i. Water Conservancy Districts and 
Subdistricts 
j. Certain agencies of the State of 
Utah 
k. Certain agencies of the United 
States Government 
1. Indian tribes 
Under the enabling laws and procedures 
set forth, each of the above named entities 
(wi th the exception of individual persons. 
agencies of the federal government, and 
Indian tribes) is governed by its own bylaws 
and regulations as to authority, powers, 
discretion, and other matters pertaining to 
the subsequent management and reallocation of 
the water rights. 
To the extent that federally reserved 
water rights or Indian water rights are 
quantified and transferable or exchangeable, 
the banking/brokering service could foster 
transactions which may include such water. 
However, the question of applicability to a 
Utah water banking operation is not addressed 
in this study. 
Coordination with State Engineer 
Under Utah law the State Engineer is to 
approve all water transfers which fall under 
the category of "change in use." This 
includes not only changes in nature of use, 
but changes in place of use and point of 
diversion as well. The State Engineer 
examines the nature of the transfer with 
particular concern for detrimental impacts 
that may result to third party water users. 
Procedural requirements for making water 
transfers are explicit and require formal 
applicat ion with the State Engi neer. He 
informs interested public about the proposed 
change, hears protests from any who feel 
threatened by the change, and then approves 
or rejects the request. The water bank/broker 
service would have to operate in conformity 
with these statutory requirements. The 
implications of doing so are analyzed in a 
subsequent section on legal feasibility 
considerations. 
Organizational Alternatives 
The operational requirements and activi-
ties of a water banking/brokering service as 
discussed in the previous section mark out 
the kind of organizational framework needed 
to effectively perform the outlined func-
tions. If the needed capability, authority, 
operating freedom, and infrastructure are 
available (or readily adaptable) within an 
existing organization, there would be little 
advantage in creating a new entity for 
operating a banking service. Consequently, 
an assessment of the practicality of locating 
the banking/brokerage function within an 
existing organizational entity is a logical 
first consideration. 
Existing organizations that may be 
prospective candidates for the water banking 
service are examined amd compared with 
respect to certain important credentials 
and/or operating criteria shown in the 
summary tabulations of Table 1. 
The comparison demonstrates that only a 
few existing organizations possess the 
breadth of geographic coverage and the 
inclusiveness of responsibility for the 
various uses and sources of water supply 
needed for a statewide banking operation. 
Many have long term encumbrances or commi t-
ments which could temper or constrain their 
objectivity in operation. It would be 
important for a broker to maintain strict 
impartiality in arranging water transfers. 
Evaluation of Existing Water 
Management Organizations 
All 16 of the existing water management 
agencies or organizational forms shown in 
Table 1 are capable of performing a kind of 
limited water banking function, and most do 
so within the framework of their water right 
entitlements. In order to compare their 
potential effectiveness as a statewide water· 
banker/broker, criteria for evaluating quali-
fications for assuming the water banking/ 
brokering role are presented in question 
form in the first column. To be a viable 
candidate does not mean an agency should 
presently possess all of the desirable fea-
tures (some are significantly more important 
than others). However, deficiencies in the 
more important areas, would seriously sub-
tract from an agency's capability to provide 
an adequate water banking service. Perhaps 
of particular importance would be fiscal and 
political accountability to an electorate; a 
breadth of water supply activity which is, or 
could be, readily expanded to be statewide in 
scope; and readily subjected to the state 
wate~ management policy. 
An analysis of Table 1 indicates that 
only seven of the established water manage-
ment agenCies analyzed possess the desired 
potent ial for providing a water bank ing/ 
brokering service (Special Service Districts, 
the State Division of Water Resources, the 
Office of the State Engineer, multicounty 
Water Conservancy Districts, and three 
agencies of the United States Government). 
However, most of these agencies have one or 
two critical drawbacks. 
Special service districts have limited 
geographic and functional constraints that 
would be difficult to modify so as to cover a 
statewide area. While water transfers will 
be generally confined to the same basin, 
there would need to be a statewide organiza-
t ional framework. Even in areas of 1 imi ted 
water trading, the possibility of rather 
massive enterprises booming on the scene 
would suggest a banking/brokering framework 
that is in a state of readiness to perform in 
any area of the state. 
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Multicounty water conservancy districts, 
with already broad functional authorization 
and extensive geographic jurisdiction, 
may be readily expandable to a statewide 
coverage. However, such entities may lack 
the desired levels of political and fiscal 
accountability to elected political bodies 
that would seem desirable in a state water 
bank. 
Three federal agencies possess the 
technical qualifications for operating 
a water banking/brokering service and offer 
much experience in information collection 
and gener al water management. However, any 
federal agency would be oriented to broad 
national policy mandates and could not be 
confined to operat ing wi thin the policy 
guidelines of the state. Though federal-
state coordination and a close working 
relationships are possible (and have been 
achieved in the past), there is no clear 
justification for federal operation of 
such a service involving state water rights 
exchanges. 
The Utah State Division of Water Re-
s ourcesand Division of Water Rights (Office 
of the State Engineer) possess the necessary 
qualifications to incorporate a water banking 
service within their scope of responsibility. 
Ideally, a water brokering organization 
should be an independent, objective facili-
tator of the market process; a facilitator 
with no vested interest to protect and not a 
participant in the market activities related 
to the water supply or consumption. The 
Division of Water Resources possesses valid 
filings ,on unappropriated water for prospec-
tive projects with which it may be involved. 
Further, since the Water Resources Division 
may sponsor its own projects under the 1977 
Water Resources Conservation and Development 
Program and may become a water entrepreneur 
in its own right, it may have difficulty 
mai~taining the desired image of objectivity 
and impartiality. 
The Division of Water Rights/Office of 
the State Engineer appears to be the most 
eligible candidate for a banking/brokering 
service from among the established water 
management agencies. To assume such a 
service would, of course, entail a broadening 
of the mission of that agency; however, there 
is significant justification for that expan-
sion in light of the strong functional ties 
between the Office of the State Engineer and 
the proposed water brokering activity. 
Alternative Organizational 
Structure 
The preceding section examined existing 
water management entities. Among those 
entities was the nonprofit corporation as 
embodied in private water 'companies and 
mutual irrigation companies. In such 
organizational forms, the nonprofit corpora-
tion lacks the potential to be expanded to a 
Table 1o Comparisons of existing water management organizations in Utah with respect to quali-
fications for assuming a water banking function ° 
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Does the sphere of activity 
currently cover a statewide No Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
area? 
Does the sphere of activity 
currently include a broad No N/A Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes range of water management No No Yes No No 
activities? 
Is the entity presently free 
from obligations to market or Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
a distribution agent Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No act as 
for other entities? 
Is the entity currently in-
volved with a wide variety of No Yes No Yes No Yes No N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
water uses? 
Is the entity currently in-
volved with a wide variety of No Yes No Yes No Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
water sources? 
Do the activities of the entity 
currently require a broad No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
concern with water quality? 
Does the entity currently have 
a staff capable of making No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
third party impact studies? 
Is the entity currently 
free from the constraint Yes Yes No Yes No , Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
of a narrowly defined mission? 
Is the entity (financial) fiscal 
policy currently subject to No N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
review and modification by any 
independent political body? 
re the general managemenc 
policies currently subject to 
review and modification by No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
any independent elected 
political body? 
Is the management 
perspective currently 
independent of contractural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
obligation to any non state 
or local entity? 
Could the sphere of activity 
be readily expanded to cover No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
a statewide area? 
Could the sphere of activity 
be readily expanded to cover No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
a broad range of water 
management activities? 
Is it prudent and logical to 
expand the sphere of No Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
activity to cover a state-
wide area? 
Does the entity currently 
possess discretionary 
powers that cOllld facilitate No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
a broad range of water 
i transfers? 
Subject to jurisdication of Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
state policy and law Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes , 
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water banking/brokering service. The struc-
ture and function of a nonprofit corporation 
are not, however, restricted to the two 
existing forms analyzed. 
A nonprofit corporation could be created 
and specifically tailored to meet the organi-
zational needs of a water banking/brokering 
service. The legislation defining the 
nonprofit corporation (Chapter 16, Section 
6 U.C.A. 1953) applies to "mutual irrigation, 
canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies 
and water users I associations" for the 
purposes of "water development, diversion, 
storage, distribution or use." They "may 
acquire, own, hold, improve, use and other-
wise deal in and with real or personal 
property, or any interest therein, wherever 
situated." 
The enabling legislation concerning 
nonprofit corporations is very flexible. 
Clearly, the articles of incorporation may be 
structured to meet any peculiar or unique 
need provided only that other laws and 
rights are not violated in so doing. The 
mutual irrigation companies and private water 
companies are just two examples of this 
flexibility. 
There would appear to be sufficient 
opportunity to incorporate political or 
fiscal accountability into the corporation 
since the art icles of incorporat ion or the 
bylaws may provide for the election or 
appointment of trustees to the governing 
board. Thus, the general public could be 
provided with an input and an effective check 
upon the operating policies of the water 
banking/brokering function. 
One existing nonprofit corporation that 
could provide a water banking/brokering 
service is the Utah Water Users' Association. 
The Association would, of course, need more 
organizational manpower to provide the 
services envisioned, yet it possesses the 
breadth of water concern and statewide 
organizational coverage that would be de-
s irable, and enjoys freedom from vested 
interest which could compromise objectivity. 
Water users statewide would naturally be 
interested in the efficient and productive 
use of the limited water resource. The 
water users' association holds no water 
rights or interests in such rights. The 
governing board of such an association, 
acting as a banker, would have to be at arms 
length from actual transactions so that there 
would be no conflict of interest. The Utah 
Water Users I Association is presently a 
r ather loose kni t and low prof ile organiza-
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tion, but may have the basic framework to 
which a water banking/brokering function 
could be successfully attached. 
Administrative Considerations 
The administrative structure of a water 
banking/brokerage organization would need to 
promote operating effectiveness in the range 
of activities in which it would be engaged. 
In order to maintain public and fiscal 
accountability, as well as state agency 
liaison, the bank would need a governing 
board whose composition reflected these 
concerns. Th is would be true whether the 
bank became an appendage of an existing 
organization or whether an entirely new 
organization were to be created. Some 
members of the governing board would properly 
be ex-officio and charged with correlating 
banking/brokering activities with administra-
tive agency missions and assuring the 
kind of legislative monitoring and oversight 
that would be desirable. Regional as well as 
sectoral water use representation would be 
important for balanced public accountability. 
Balanced political affiliation on statewide 
boards is customary and perhaps should be a 
requirement. Other considerations which are 
routinely included in the organizational 
bylaws regarding appointments, selection of 
officers, etc., would require attention. 
The bank would need an executive officer 
to manage day to day affairs under the 
guidance of the board. The manager and other 
professional personnel should be selected on 
the basis of their special knowledge and 
familiarity with water management in general, 
water transfers in particular, and the 
institutional mechanisms that are pertinent. 
Individual capabilities required would depend 
on the breadth and depth of banking or 
brokering services provided. The marketing 
of water rights would require emphasis on 
those activities that make information about 
water availabilities and water needs broadly 
available. This may include various means of 
advertising, soliciting, and personal 
contacts to locate buyers or sellers of water 
rights and to make them aware of market 
possibilities. 
If public monies are used to support the 
banking/brokering function, good records and 
documentation of activities would be needed 
so that the public value of the bank could be 
assessed. It would be important to know 
whether the bank actually facilitated the 
water transfer process and whether it ac-
complished its mandate in a cost-effective 
manner. 
III. HYDROLOGIC/ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS 
Water Transfers and Third 
Party Impacts 
Typically, the transfer of water to a 
new use will entail a different complex of 
physical facilities to manage the water sup-
ply in conformity with the new use require-
ments. Since waters of a hydrologic system 
constitute a unified and interrelated flow 
system, a physical modification at one point 
is likely to induce modification in the 
quantity, quality, or regimen of flow avail-
able to downstream 10cat ions. Uses vary 
greatly in what they do with and to water in 
the use process. Thus, a change in use may 
cause trivial or major effects on other 
water users who draw their entitlements from 
the common hydrologic (river basin) system. 
The investments of all legitimate water 
right owners must be protected from injury 
caused by capricious manipulation of the 
common supply. Th erefore, wa ter equ i ty 
transfers--the central activity of a water 
bank ing/brokerage service--must entai 1 a 
projection of the physical impacts of any 
proposed water transfer. Accurate physical 
projections require an understanding of the 
interconnection of all surface and subsurface 
waters; an appreciation of the interlink-
ing character of the various flow subsystems 
of which a river basin is comprised; and a 
knowledge of technological options and their 
cost-effective application in the management 
of water. 
The key question in evaluating any water 
transfer or change use situation is: will the 
proposed transfer of equity interests have 
significant detrimental impacts on existing 
holders of water rights? Since the State 
Engineer must make all water uses a matter of 
legal record and provide protection of those 
legally established rights, he must be 
convinced that a proposed change in use 1) 
causes no injury or harm to other water 
users, or 2) that hydrologic (or monetary) 
compensation has been made to the satisfac-
tion of third parties for any injury sus-
tained. Since such tests are a legal pre-
requisite to any water right transfer, 
the State Engineer seeks good "hydrologic" 
and "engineering feas ibi li ty" appraisal 
capability to support his decisions. Water 
rights transactions arranged under the 
auspices of a water banking/brokerage 
service would be contingent upon resolution 
of any third party impact problems. The 
service would have to have capability to pre-
dict such impacts from proposed water trans-
fers to the State Engineer's satisfaction or 
this assessment would have to be done by the 
Office of the State Engineer, as at present. 
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Detrimental third party effects stemming 
from a water use change may be in terms of 
quantity, quality (physical, chemical, 
biological, or temperature alterations) or 
timing impairments. Consequently, it would 
be necessary to project the water quality and 
timing consequences of any proposed change of 
use as well as the quantity impacts that 
are generally given more attention in water 
right transfers. While the State Engineer 
has statutory responsibility "to prevent 
waste, pollution, or contamination of waters 
of the state" which would cause injury to 
other users, the Division of Health, together 
with the Water Pollution Control and Safe 
Drinking Water Committees, has been given the 
major regulatory responsibility over water 
quality maintenance. Thus, while the water 
right would be the normal medium of exchange 
in the operation of the water banking/broker-
ing system, and while water rights are the 
clear province of the State Engineer, water 
transactions through a water broker would 
have to be in conformity with water quality 
management regulations and programs as 
administered by the Division of Environmental 
Quality and its Committees on Water Pollution 
Control and Safe Drinking Water. 
Hydrologic Unity and Water 
Use Inhomogeneity 
To function successfully, the operating 
policies and procedures of a water banking/ 
brokerage service must be properly harmonized 
with hydrologiC and engineering reality. 
While this may seem a trite statement, hazy 
or incorrect notions about water use dynamics 
are quite commonly responsible for decisions 
and program initiatives which turn out to be 
inconsistent and incongruent with physical 
reality. Some of these faulty hydrologic 
notions create unnecessary obstacles in 
working out the terms of a water transfer. 
Perhaps the root cause of most of these 
incorrect ideas about water is in the 
improper characterization of the water 
resource system and the perception of water 
uses in the same conceptual framework as 
non-water resource uses (such as coal or 
oil). One major difference between water'and 
most non-water resources is in the nature of 
the system "res idua1s. " When resources such 
as coal or oil are "used" (i.e., for energy 
production), the output or residual products 
have an entirely different molecular makeup 
than the original substance. The original 
compound is never reconstituted. However, 
water does not change its molecular composi-
tion in use. It may change its state (solid, 
liquid. or vapor) and its quality (in terms 
of asso~iated chemical, biological, or 
physical constituents) as it circulates 
through natural or man-made systems, but 
it still remains H20. Thus, the finite 
quantity of water associated with the earth 
remains constant and all uses are in fact 
reuses from a supply in epdless circulation. 
Water is often referred to as a "renewable 
resource," meaning that hydrologic cycles are 
statistically repetitive so that input 
quantities to particular use entities are 
renewed as prior input quantities course 
through and are discharged in various ways 
from any given system. Outputs from one 
geographically or geometrically described 
system become inputs to another. However, 
the quantity-quality-timing characteristics 
of the incoming supply undergo transformation 
in the use process so that effluents, or 
residuals, are characterized by changes in 
one or more of these basic characteristics. 
In accordance with the principle of hy-
drologic unity, a change in use pattern at 
one point has an inevitable ripple of in-
fluence to downstream user entities. This 
"hydrologic externality" gives rise to 
"economic externalities" in water development 
and use. To ignore, or incorrectly presume 
boundaries and boundary conditions that 
pertain to interesting portions of inter-
connected flow systems leads to poor defi-
nition of the flow residuals which may 
constitute critical elements of supply for 
subsequent users. Thus, the meaning ascribed 
to such terms as "water use efficiency," 
"water losses," "water conservation," "water 
savings," etc. are commonly misleading and 
often give erroneous manifestations of what 
can be expected to happen when a water 
entitlement is transferred from one use to 
another. (1) Thus, the assessment of third 
party injury associated with a proposed 
water transfer is often frustrated in having 
to overcome certain widely held but erroneous 
presumptions. 
It was previously noted that water uses 
vary greatly in what they do "with" and "to" 
water in the use process. Some uses are 
consumptive (meaning that water is converted 
to a vapor and expelled to the atmosphere, 
i.e., irrigation). Others are nonconsumptive 
(OSee for example ''Water Banking: How to Stop 
Wasting Agricul tural Water" by Soterios. Angeledes, 
and Bardach. Institute for Contemporary Studies, San 
Francisco, Calif., 1978, page 1. 
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(meaning that essentially all the intake 
water is discharged back into the system 
in liquid form, i.e., hydro-power and indus-
trial cooling). Some recreational uses such 
as swimming and boating merely make contact 
with water in the use process. Obviously, 
this lack of homogeneity-in-use impact 
on both the diversion and effluent side of a 
water using system presents some significant 
operational differences in making water 
transfers from one use to another and from 
one place to another. Water transfers between 
nonhomogeneous users will generally require 
adjustment in the flow specifications of the 
right so that third party entitlements remain 
unaffected. The nature and extent of the 
adjustment is a hydrologic/engineering 
determination. 
Although water rights are much more 
explicit about diversion allowances, every 
right has some implicit limitations asso-
ciated with the discharge or return flow side 
as well. Whether points of diversion and 
places of use are moved upstream, downstream, 
or out of basin, and whether management 
measures employed in the original and new use 
create different influences on flow patterns 
and characteristics are also important 
factors to consider. 
To summarize, central to the concept of 
water banking/brokering function is the ad-
vantageous transfer of water equities. Water 
transfers and changes in point of diversion, 
nature, and place of use require the State 
Engineer's approval. That approval is based 
on whether projections of the physical 
impacts on other water rights is injurious. 
If detrimental impacts on third larties 
are projected as result of a propose trans-
fer, then some kind of mutually satisfying 
compensatory arrangement must be made before 
the transfer can take place. The determina-
tion of what constitutes equitable hyrologic 
compensation, as well as what the specific 
hydrologic impacts might be, requires a good 
hydrologic evaluative capability. If an 
agent bank/broker provides the full range of 
professional services that may be called 
into play in any given water transaction, 
this evaluative capability would have to be 
available through staff or on call arrange-
ments. Unless an agreed upon water transfer 
is backed up by a definitive evaluation of 
third party impacts, it is likely to en-
counter bothersome and time consuming re-
negotiations as third party complaints are 
registered with the State Engineer. 
IV. LEGAL FEASIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
The intent of this section is to objec-
tively identify potential legal limitations, 
conflicts, or constraints to implementation 
of the water banking/brokering concept. In 
addition, suggestions are made for possible 
ways of dealing with these limi tat ions, 
conflicts, or constraints where appropriate. 
These suggestions might be useful in con-
sidering the implementation of a service but 
should not be construed as advocating the 
adoption of the banking or brokerage concept. 
This legal analysis is limited to the 
current water law in Utah; however, many of 
the observations are applicable to other 
states which operate under the so-called 
prior appropriation doctrine. 
Throughout the analysis, the various 
alternative mechanisms of banking/brokering 
.discussed elsewhere in the report are con-
sidered in a comparative fashion in order to 
distinguish the differing manner in which 
the laws limit or constrain each alternative. 
Constitutional Implications of Water 
Transfers and Exchanges 
There is only one portion of the Utah 
Constitution which explicitly relates to the 
transfer of water rights. Section 6 of 
Article XI imposes a blanket prohibition on 
all "municipal corporations" against all 
forms of transfer of water rights except for 
exchanges of "equal value. "(I) 
While this provision appears prohibitive 
of any permanent transfer, the Utah Supreme 
Court has interpreted the provision to allow 
(l}Article XI, Section 6, reads thusly: 
No municipal corporation, shall direct-
ly or indi rect ly, lease, se II, alien or 
dispose of any water works, water rights, or 
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to 
be owned or controlled by it; but all such 
waterworks, water rights and sources of 
water supply now owned or hereafter to be 
acquired by any municipal corporation, shall 
be preserved, maintained and operated by it 
for supplying its inhabitants with water at 
reasonable charges: Provided, That nothing 
herein con ta ined shall be cons t rued to 
prevent any such municipal corporation from 
exchanging water rights, or sources of water 
supply, for other water rights or sources of 
water supply of equal value, and to be 
devoted in like manner to the pub lie supply 
of its habitants. 
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mUnicipalities to sell excess waters as long 
as such sale is not an obligation in perpe-
tuity. In a 1938 case involving the sale of 
water between towns, Judge Wolfe states: "A 
city may sell its excess water to outs iders. 
Such is not a sale of its water sources or 
water rights but water from its system in the 
manner it sells to its citizens. "(2) 
The implication of this opinion by Judge 
Wolfe is that so long as there is no transfer 
of the title, or more correctly, the water 
right, a transfer of a physical quantity of 
water (if determined to be excess) is permis-
sible. I t seems logical, therefore, to 
assume that any municipality could market its 
"excess" water through a water brokerage 
operation with clear provisions that such 
participation does not constitute a transfer 
of water rights. Municipalities would most 
li kely have author ity to make thei r own 
determinations of what water is in fact 
"excess." Court intrusion into this deter-
mination would likely occur only if the 
actions of the municipality were deemed to be 
arbitrary or capricious under the doctrine of 
usual judicial deference to administrative 
determinations. In other words, so long as 
the city or town does not abase its power 
by making arbitrary determinations and so 
long as the citizens of the city and town 
are supplied with sufficient water at 
"reasonable charges,"(3) the city or town 
can market the excess physical supply for 
certain limited periods. Most cities and 
towns have good historical use records 
and can combine operating data with available 
stream forecast information to determine 
whether and how much excess waters might be 
offered to others on a year by year basis. 
Some cities have kept so well ahead of 
demand that they enjoy perennial surpluses.-
Most cities try to provide supplies in 
advance of need. In meeting steadily 
increasing demands by periodic quantum 
increases in supply, a city experiences 
periods when delivery capacity and water 
supply exceed demands. Water could be made 
available to others during such perinds. 
Making availability known would increase the 
relative marketability of the water to 
(2}Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 U.88, 80 
P. 2d 930. rehearing denied 96 U 104, 85 P. 2d 790, 
935. See also Hyde Park Town v. Chambers, 104 P 2d 
222 (1940). 
(3}Constitution of Utah, Article XI, Section 6. 
potential buyers. The municipalities would 
not, however, be able to participate in 
any banking or brokerage of water ri~hts 
wherein the ownership of the right is in act 
transferred. 
Exchanges are a category of transfers 
which is much more permissive under this 
constitutional constraint. Under the con-
stitutional allowance for exchanges by 
municipalities, there are two criteria or 
conditions which must be met by any exchange. 
The first condition is that the exchange must 
be of "equal value." The second is that the 
exchanged water " ••• be devoted in like manner 
to the public supply of its inhabitants." 
The requirement of "equal value" was 
liberally held by the Supreme Court to mean 
equal value. In holding thusly, Judge 
Wolfe sates, "I tis agreed that the word 
'value' in Sec. 6, Art. 11, does not mean 
equal money value or equal value on the 
market, but equal use value to the community 
attaining the waters given in exchange. "(4) 
The value of a water right is determined 
largely by quantity, quality, timeliness, and 
certainty of availability factors. One kind 
of use may place higher premi um on some of 
these characteristics than would other uses. 
For example, it may make little difference 
to an irrigator whether his supply contains 
300 ppm or 600 ppm of dissolved minerals. 
However, it would make a great deal of dif-
ference to a municipality with drinking water 
standards mandated at no more than 500 ppm 
total dissolved solids. Thus, if an irriga-
t ion right of 300 ppm dissolved solids were 
to be exchanged for a municipally owned 
source containing 600 ppm (all other factors 
equal) it could be of great advantage to the 
municipality and result in minor detriment to 
the irrigator~ Yet, such an exchange would 
probably not take place without some compen-
satory recognition of the loss in quality to 
the irrigation right. That compensation 
might be in terms of dollars or in improved 
quantity, timing, or certainty as an offset 
to the acceptance of lower quality. However, 
an exchange could likely be worked out so 
that both parties end up with a net gain in 
the exchange process. 
Actual use value of water involved in an 
exchange between owners depends upon many 
complex but often site-specific factors. 
Therefore, the courts have deferred, and will 
probably cont inue to defer, to the good 
judgment of the municipalities involved in 
deciding if an exchange proposal- is of equal 
use value. (5) The implication s~ems to 
(4)SO P. 2d 930, 936, 
(5)Judge Wolfe sums this concept by stating, 
"Who can say that under such circumstances the use 
value may not be equal? It is somewhat like appraising 
the use value of a cow as compared to a horse on a 
farm, where both are necessary." SO P. 2d 930, 936. 
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be that so long as the water obtained by 
the municipality in the exchange is of some 
use or necessity to that municipality, the 
exchange is legally valid and not in viola-
t ion of Sect ion 6. Th is does not mean, 
however, that a city or town may make capri-
cious exchanges without judicial scrutiny. 
It merely means that so long as the munici-
pality exercises reasonable judgment, the 
exchange will be acceptable. In relation to 
the brokerage or banking concept, such 
liberal allowance for exchanges would likely 
make possible the exchange of water rights 
based on such factors as time of use, point 
and cost of delivery, treatment costs, and 
relative priority of the rights themselves. 
The second cons t i tut ional cr iter i a for 
exchanging water, that it be devoted to a 
"like manner" use, has also been given liber-
al interpretation by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In the first case on this issue, the Court 
allowed Salt Lake Ci ty to exchange nonpota-
ble, relatively low quality irrigation water 
from Big Cottonwood, Millcreek and Little 
Cottonwood Creeks.(6) This ruling was later 
endorsed by the court and expressly stated 
that, " ••. the water given need not be fit for 
all the uses of the waters obtained. "(7) 
In summary, given the liberal interpre-
tations of the Utah courts, there does seem 
to be a potential for municipalities to 
participate to a limited extent in banking or 
brokering of water. Where a municipality 
has an obvious excess of supply almost every 
year and where the most likely or logical 
buyer(s) are not always evident in advance, 
it could "deposit"(8) the call-bid option 
in the bank wherein any user could bid for 
the use for a specified period of time 
depending on its needs and willingness to 
pay. Where a city or town desires to in-
crease its water supply seasonally while 
experiencing surpluses at other seasons, the 
municipality may advantageously "deposit" 
surpluses in the brokerage stipulating that 
it is available on an exchange arrangement. 
Other entities which own water rights 
(e.g., water companies, metropolitan water 
(6)State ex. reI. Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake City, 
29 Ut 361, SI P273-.-
The power and authority of the city to 
thus contract for and exchange its ... water, 
which is of inferior quality ..• for a supe-
rior quality of mountain water is expressly 
conferred by section 6 of the Constitution, 
unless it can be said that the trans fer and· 
exchange of water as contemplated would fail 
to vest the city with ownership and control 
of the water received by it in the ex-
change. 
(7)SO P. 2d 930, 936-937. 
(S)This deposit would not in fact be a trans-
fer of the water right itself, but merely an announce-
ment of availability. 
districts, etc.) have no comparable constitu-
t ional prohibi t ions on water r igh ts trans-
fers' and would therefore be subject only to 
the constitutional requirement of due 
process. The due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution(9) coupled with the United 
States constitutional counterparts, while not 
directly constraining, must be considered in 
the operation of a water banking concept. 
The State of Utah holds all waters of 
the state in trust.(lO) However, the courts 
and subsequent law have construed a water 
right itself to be a form of property 
right. (ll) Because of this interpretation, 
any transfer of water will be subject to the 
usual tests of due process. The due process 
concern most directly related to water rights 
is the general requirement that all poten-
tially affected parties with legitimate 
r igh ts have proper and timely not ice of the 
proposed action with adequate opportunity to 
be heard. (12) 
Under current Utah law, these due 
process concerns are generally accounted for 
by the appropriation and the so-called 
change-of-use procedures of the Utah State 
Engineer. (13) If the creation of a banking 
or brokerage system required revision of any 
appropriation or change-of-use procedures, 
due process safeguards would have to be 
included. 
Statutory Considerations 
While many statutes and rules and 
regulations will inevitably affect how a 
bank i ng/broker age sys tem f unc t ions, th i s 
section considers only those statutes which 
directly constrain or limit key attri-
butes of the system. If the major potential 
(9)Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 
7: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
{lO)UCA § 73-1-1: "All waters of this state, 
whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared 
to be the property of the public, subject to all 
existing rights to the use thereof." 
(lOs R' • ee e.g. onZ10 v. Denver & R10 Grande 
Western R.R., 116 -v:--u 604.---rriftllCir. 1940): 
"While the corpus of the naturally running water 
belongs to the state in trust for the public, the law 
recognizes a property right in its flow and use, known 
as the usufructuary right or the water right." 
at 605. See also generally Wiel ~ Water Rights, 
Vol. I, 3rd Ed, p 304. 
(12)See generally Chrisiansen v. Harris 109 
Ut I, 163 P. 2d 314. Specific to water rights see 
Mosby Irrigation v. Criddle, 11 Ut 2d 41, 354 P. 
2d 848. 
(13)UCA § 73-3-2 to 73-3-18. 
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statutory impediments to initiating a banking 
or brokerage system can be resolved, sub-
sequent focus on the more detailed law can 
i ron out secondary problems. Thus, only 
those statutory provisions having potential 
for major impediments are identified here 
wi th some appraisal of how they may affect 
the des irable operating object ives of a 
water bank as considered in Chapter II. 
Limitations on Speculation 
The normal market place is characterized 
by an element of risk and opportunity for 
speCUlation. For capital to be invested in 
the purchase of water rights, there must be 
'an expected economic return, and the invest-
ment is speCUlative in the sense that the 
amount of return is not precisely known in 
advance. 
There is a statutory prohibition against 
speculation in water rights which stems from 
a concern that individuals not have oppor-
tunity to monopolize water in ways that 
result in some unreasonable private windfall 
gain to the public detriment. The statute 
governing the approval or rejection of appli-
cations for unappropriated water requires the 
State Engineer to determine whether, " ••• the 
application was filed in good faith and not 
for purposes of speculation or monopoly."(14) 
If the State Engineer determines that an ap-
plication is for speculative purposes, then 
the application must be rejected. The legal 
issue then becomes what is judicially defined 
as speculation by the courts. 
The first Supreme Court case to directly 
address this issue involved an application to 
appropriate irrigation water to lands in 
which neither the applicant nor the protes-
tant held any form of legal interest at 
the time of the application. (15) The court 
framed the question to be: "Mayan applica-
t ion be made to appropriate water for a 
beneficial purpose so contemplated in the 
future?"(16) 
The answer of the court was not defini-
tive, but does seem to accept the practical 
realities of certain water developments by 
allowin§ such applications if done in "good 
faith.' The court's specific language 
illustrates the uncertainty, 
We confess that the question 
is open to debate and is not 
free from doubt. We have, however, 
with some hesitancy, reached the 
conclusion that such an application 
(14)Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(4). 
(15)Sowards v Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 
1112 (1910). cf: State v Corder, 78 NM 312, 431 P2d 
49 (1967). Compare '""GOodwin v Tracey', 6 Utah 2d I, 304 
P2d 964. 
(16)108 P. 1112, 1116. 
may properly be made when it is 
made in good faith and with an 
actual bona fide intention and a 
present design to appropriate the 
water for a beneficial use, though 
contemplated in the future, and 
when it is not made for the pur-
poses of mere speculation or 
monopoly. (17) 
The reasoning of the court weighed heavily on 
the political endorsement of water develop-
ment and implied a recognition that at 
least some "good faith" speculation is 
necessary for such a policy to be carried 
out. In the context of this reasoning, the 
word "mere" from the Sowards v. Meagher 
decision quoted above may be of significance. 
By us ing the q uali fyi ng word "mere" before 
the word speculation, the court appears 
to openly endorse some speculation as long as 
the application is not for the sole or 
exclusive purpose of speculation or monopoly. 
This allowance for some speculation then begs 
for some threshold to be identified wherein 
any less existence of "good faith" specula-
tion would be grounds to reject the applica-
t ion. The court did not clearly identify 
such a threshold; however, it did identify 
certain speculative actions which appear to 
be acceptable under the law. 
One such action which the court en-
dorsed, and which relates directly to the 
water brokering concept, is where an appli-
cant appropriator, 
••. may comprehend a use to be 
made by or through another person, 
and upon lands and possessions 
other than those of the appro-
priator. Thus the appropriator is 
enabled to complete and finally 
establish his appropriation through 
the agency of the user. (18) 
In other words, appropriations can be ap-
proved for individuals acting essentially 
as agents for the ultimate users. 
The nearest the court gets to outlining 
criteria for determining the legally accept-
able degree of speculation is the statement 
that, as long as 
it fairly is made to appear 
that when work prosecuted 
with reasonable diligence and 
dispatch ••. and the water applied 
to the beneficial purpose for which 
the appropriation is proposed, we 
see no good reason why the applica-
tion should not be received and the 
(l7)Ibid. 
(8)108 P. 1112, 1116-1117 citing directly 
Nevada Ditch Co. v Bennett 30 or 59, 45 P. 472. 
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applicant protected in his incep-
tive right. (19) 
The real caution in making inferences from 
this case to the banking/brokering concept 
is that the court focused upon an application 
to appropriate and did not consider applica-
t ions for a change of use which would 
be the predominant situation under the 
brokering system. To infer that this ruling 
would directly apply to change-of-use appli-
cations may be somewhat presumptuous.(20) 
There remain some gray areas in the judicial 
interpretations regarding the statutory 
prohibitions on speculation or monopoly which 
may pose potential legal constraints on at 
least any de facto speculative applications 
for a change of use. However, the requirement 
of "due di ligence" in placing the water 
in question to the intended use can do much 
to discourage speculation unless it is too 
liberally interpreted or laxly administered. 
A different line of reasoning which 
considers the extent of the speculation or 
"expectation value" of a water right has 
evolved from the early water condemnation 
cases.(2l) In these cases, the issue re-
volved around what is the true market value 
of the condemned water right. More specifi-
cally, is the right only for that quantity 
and/or quality of water necessary to satisfy 
the existing beneficial use, or does it also 
include in addition the highest possible use 
of that quantity and/or quality of water 
despite the fact that there has been no 
formal application for a change of use? In 
the above referenced condemnation cases, the 
view has been that there is some type of 
"inchoate right. "(22) The confusion under-
lying such reasoning has been what Judge 
Wolfe called "... a more fundamental fail-
ure to keep in mind the true nature of 
(9)Ibid, 1117. 
(20)This is some judicial support, albeit in 
a dissenting opLnLon that the provisions of this 
appropriation section applies to change-of-use ap-
plications. "rt should be noted that in a case of an 
application for a permanent change as compared to a 
temporary change the procedure shall be the same as is 
provided for in appl ications to appropriate water." 
In M(Yle v Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P2d 882, 
895 1947).~olfe, J, dissenting in part.) 
(2l)see e.g., Shurtleff v Salt Lake City, 96 
Utah 21, 82 P2d 561, (1938); Sigurd City v State. 105 
Utah 278, 142 P2d 159 (1943); and M)Yle v Salt Lake 
City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P2d 882 (1947 • 
(22)wolfe, J, dissenting in part in Moyle v 
Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P2d 882, 895. 
the right which an appropriator has."(23) 
These cases viewed the property right to be 
in the water itself and did not properly 
perceive the implied or explicit relation to 
other users of the same system. As noted in 
previous sections, transfers from one use to 
another may alter the flow relationships 
among the set of users such that existing 
rights are affected. Judge Wolfe's view was 
that the "... right to change the place of 
diversion [or use] is not an absolute or 
vested right, but is only a conditional or 
qualified one. "(24) An early U.S. Supreme 
Court case recognized this reality in 
stating, "The appropriation does not confer 
such an absolute right. "(25) Judge Wolfe 
sums up his view by stating, 
The right to the use of water which 
an appropriator carves out from the 
general pool of public property is 
one for beneficial use only and not 
for speculation or traffic ana-such 
beneficial use is the basis, the 
measure and the limit of the 
right. (26) 
With our present ability to assess the 
potential hydrologic consequences of a given 
water right transfer, it is doubtful that any 
effort to obtain a "higher or better" use via 
the change application process could con-
stitute an uncontrollable speculative threat, 
Therefore, the possibility of enlarging 
opportunity to speculate in water rights 
does not seem to be of significant con-
sequence of a water brokering service. 
Only if the banking/brokering service were 
chartered to participate in the market as an 
owner of water rights could its operation 
interject added potential for speculation and 
monopoly. 
Due Diligence and Use Requirements 
An important requirement in any appro-
priation or change of use application is 
that the water described in the application 
be continued in a "beneficial use," The 
statute is very clear that the State Engineer 
has the discretionary power to fix a date by 
which the water must be put to beneficial 
use~(27) The State Engineer may allow 
extensions of time for up to 14 years upon a 
"proper showing of diligence or reasonable 
cause for delay," (Extensions of time can be 
(23)Ibid, 896. 
(24) Ibid, 895, citing United States v Caldwell, 
64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434, 439-,-- ---
(25)Atchison v Peterson, 20 Wall. 507, 87 
US507, 512. 
(26)176 P2d 882, 901. See in re ~ rights 
of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah 2d77, 348 
P2d 679(1960). 
(27)Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12. 
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granted beyond 14 years, but they must be 
advertized and comply with the rule of 
diligence.) Extensions of time to prove 
beneficial use relates to the issue of 
speculation in that certain extension re-
quests are based on unfulfilled expectations. 
In the context of a water banking system, 
if unperfected but approved appropriations 
were marketed through the bank, there may be 
some legal constraints imposed. In a similar 
case on the issue of due diligence and the 
conditions allowed for extensions, the 
Utah Supreme Court placed a high standard of 
showing on any applicant seeking an exten-
sion, thusly by requiring a " ... high type of 
convincing evidence" supporting such requests 
for extensions.(28) 
Forfeiture and Abandonment 
Implications 
Neither the forfeiture nor the abandon-
ment processes appear to be significant 
constraints upon the operation of a banking 
system. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
distinguished between forfeiture and abandon-
ment. The key case on this issue quotes 
Kinney in stating that 
While upon the one hand, abandon-
ment is the relinquishment of 
the right by the owner with the 
intent ion to forsake and desert 
it, forfeiture upon the other hand, 
is the involuntary or forced loss 
of the right, caused by failure of 
the appropriator or owner to do or 
perform some act required by the 
statute,(29) 
Under current law, the only way in which 
a forfeiture will occur is if the appro-
priator does in fact ""~. cease to use water 
for a period of five years."(30) It is very 
unlikely that any appropriator would so cease 
the use of water while listed or deposited in 
the banking/brokering system. Therefore, 
barring unusual circumstances, forfeiture 
itself does not appear to pose any signi-
ficant legal constraint to the operation 
of a water bank. 
Abandonment, on the other hand, has no 
definite time period but is proved by a 
showing that the appropriator did in fact 
" •• , intentionally release or surrender such 
(28)Carbon Canal Co. v Sanpete Water Users 
Assn., 19 Utah 2d6, 425 P2d 405, 407 096~ 
(29)Hammond v Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 
P2d 894, 900 (937). See in ~ Drainage Area of Bear 
River in Rich County, 12 (ltah 2dl, 361 P2d 407(1961) 
citing 2 Kinney on Irrigation & Water Rights (2d Ed) 
p. 2020, 1118. 
(30)Utah Code Ann. S 73-1-4. 
right to the public."(31) Further, the court 
has held the term "abandon" to mean "to 
desert or forsake. "(32) In other words, 
there must be a clear intent to totally 
relinquish the right. Renting and leasing 
water entitlements is very common in Utah. 
Water stock in an irrigation company can be 
rented or leased for an indefin<ite time 
without any threat of loss by forfeiture or 
abandonment. It appears very unlikely that 
"deposits" in a water bank would be construed 
as abandonment. 
The Discretionary Authority 
of the St<ate Engineer 
The administrative aspects of water 
right appropriations and transfers have been 
statutorially delegated to the State Engi-
neer.(33) The State Engineer has been granted 
the very important administrative respon-
sibility to " ••• make and publish such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary 
from time to time fully to carry out the 
duties of his office, and particularly to 
secure the equitable and fair apP'ortionment 
and distribution of the water. "(34) Accord-
ing to the respective rights of appropria-
tions with this rule making power, the State 
Engineer can then develop any system of water 
rights transfer which complies with the 
statutory framework governing transfers. Of 
course, his decisions will always be subject 
to judicial review with respect to compliance 
wi th the law and especially in terms of the 
above-mentioned due process requirements 
under the Constitution. (35) In other 
words, the grant of discretionary powers to 
the State Engineer would not in and of 
itself constrain the development of a banking 
or brokerage system because the framework or 
limitations on this grant of discretionary 
power came from the laws governing transfers. 
Therefore, to identify possible constraints, 
these transfer statutes must be analyzed. 
Initial Appropriation Conditions 
Any valid appropriation must meet 
certain basic requirements that can be 
viewed as limitations on the extent of the 
right. There must be 1) a diversion from a 
natural channel or lake, 2) a recognized 
beneficial use for the water, 3) the appli-
cation of that water to said beneficial 
use (on a particular parcel of land) in a 
(31)361 P2d 407, 409. 
(32)66 P2d 894, 899. 
(33)UCA 73-2-l. 
(34)Ibid. 
(35)see especially American Fork Irrigation 
Company v. Linke, 121 Ut 90, 239 P. 2d 188 (1951). 
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reasonable time,(36) 4) a stated quantity 
or flow of water associated with the use, 5) 
a specified period or time of use during the 
year, and lastly, but perhaps most important, 
6) a finding that the use will not interfere 
with other valid water rights 
These conditions constitute a permanent 
part of the water right description. If a 
transfer in ownership is contemplated and the 
new use entails a change in the stated con-
ditions set forth in the original appropria-
t ion, then such changes would need approval 
of the State Engineer. Where the right is 
held by a mutual water company or irrigation 
district, any individual transfers within the 
company's descr ibed area of application can 
be made at the discretion of the shareholders 
in those companies. These "share" rights are 
sometimes referred to as nonappurtenant 
rights as distinguished from individual 
rights identified with specified lands in the 
original appropriation. However, water rights 
in Utah are generally not thought of as 
appurtenant in the sense that water cannot be 
sold separate from the land to which it 
was originally appropriated. Devoid of the 
encumbrance of tight geographical and physi-
cal limitations, there is freedom and/or 
flexibility under Utah law for transfers 
suited to a water banking/brokerage concept. 
Water shares of a mutual irrigation 
company can be bought, sold or leased without 
a change of use procedure as long as the 
transfers are within the constraints of the 
original primary' appropriation to the 
corporate entity. (37) There may be little 
need for adoption of a water bank or broker-
age service for such intra-company transac-
t ions of small organizations. However, 
where the regional jurisdiction is rather 
large and composed of a large number of 
widely separated shareholders, a central 
coordinating and information service could be 
useful. In most cases, the management of 
these mutual irrigation companies is well 
suited and, In some instances, provides a 
form of brokerage or central clearinghouse 
for shareholders in the companies. Therefore, 
there appears little need for imposition of a 
banking or brokerage system into i ntra-
company transactions of small organizations. 
The Change-of-Use Procedure 
It follows from the previous discussion 
that the predominant legal element which may 
constrain the operation of a banking or 
brokerage system relates to whatever limita-
(36)Sowards v. Meagher, 37 ut. 212, 108 P. 
1112 (1910). 
(37)The rule that intra cOmpany transfers 
between shareholders are not changes of use under 
the law was clearly declared in Arnold v. Huntington 
Canal and Reservoir Ass 'n, 64 Ut. 534, 231 P. 622. 
tions the change-of-use procedures imply 
to the voluntary transfer of water rights. 
Substantive Factors. Generally speaking, 
the statute (section 73-3-3 of the Utah Code) 
and the subsequent court interpretations have 
been fairly liberal in allowing use changes. 
However, strict adherence has been required 
to the procedural aspects. 
The Utah law provides that "Any person 
entitled to the use of water, may change the 
place of diversion or use or may use the 
water for other purposes than those for which 
it was originally appropriated" (Section 
73-3-3). Both permanent and temporary 
changes of point of diversion and place or 
purpose of use of water are permitted. 
Therefore, the basic change use process would 
in no way constrain the development of a 
banking or brokerage system. The most im-
portant potential constraint is that: "No 
such change (of use) shall be made if it 
impairs any vested right without just com-
pensat ion" (Sect ion 73-3-3). In a fully 
appropriated stream system, strict observance 
of a policy prohibiting hydrologic impairment 
may limit opportunities to transfer water 
equities. The courts have used tests of 
"reasonableness" in facing the impairment 
question recognizing the necessity of bal-
ancing the vested rights with the changing 
socio-economic conditions demanding shifts in 
water use and distribution. 
In a relatively recent case, the Supreme 
Court focused on the "onerous" burden of a 
rigid application of law. In reviewing a 
protested change-of-use application, the 
Court stated: 
We recognize plaintiff's [applicant 
for a change] duty to prove that 
vested rights will not be impaired 
by approval of their application, 
but we also recognize that such 
duty must not be made unreasonably 
onerous to the point where every 
remote but presently indetermin-
able vested right must be pin-
pointed. (38) 
The Court also drew upon the statutory policy 
of beneficial use to decide whether the 
change-of-use should be allowed noting that 
where the possibility of impairment of vested 
rights were somewhat speculative and where 
the resulting use is of more net benefit to 
(8)A . F k I . . C . merl.can or " rrl.gatl.on o. v. Ll.nke, 
121 Ut. 90, 239 P. 2d 188 (1950, 191. See also Tanner 
v. Humphreys, 87 Ut. 164, 48 P. 2d 484, and Eard~ 
Terry, 94 Ut. 367, 77 P. 2d 362. 
19 
the state than the previous use, then the 
change is justified.(39) 
Further and more comprehensive recogni-
tion of the necessity of balancing vested 
rights against the state policy of progres-
sive development of water was made by the 
Supreme Court in a recent case involving 
a change of an underground water use by 
moving and enlarging a well. The Court, 
indicta, builds support from the paraphrasing 
of the statutQry policy on water develop-
ment(40) by stating: 
Because of the vital importance of 
water to this region both our 
statutory and decisional law have 
been fashioned in recognition of 
the desirability and of the neces-
sity of insuring the highest 
possible development and the 
most continuous beneficial use of 
all available water w:i,th as 
little waste as possible. (41) " 
In support of this policy, the Court then 
declared that where changes of use are being 
considered, the State (through the State 
Engineer) must balance the vested interests 
involved against the policy of development 
and highest beneficial use: 
(A)ttempting to carry out the 
overriding purpose of our water 
law, of seeing that all available 
water is put to beneficial use, and 
at the same time preserve the 
rights of individual users to a 
particular flow of water, presents 
a problem which is perplexing 
indeed. Though there is no precise 
answer, this writer believes that 
the best approximation of an answer 
is to be found in recognizing the 
necessity of analyzing the total 
situation and the balancing of 
individual rights in relationship 
to each other in a reasonable way 
under the circumstances which will 
(39}239 P. 2d 188, 191: "And we cannot turn 
a deaf ear to every request which reasonably appears 
designed for ~ ~ beneficial ~ of ~ not 
impairing vested rights, by saying •.• that the proposed 
change could interfere substantially with the vested 
rights of others." (Emphasis added.) 
(40}UCA 73-1-3: "Beneficial use shall be 
the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to 
the use of water in this state." 
(41)W C· C . 23 U ~ v. Mrrray) ~ orporatl.on, t. 
2d 97, 458 P. 2d 861 1969. 
best serve 
objective. (42) the above [Emphasis 
stated 
added. 1 
This stated policy of the Court can be 
interpreted to mean that the requirement 
to protect vested rights is a constraint, but 
not an overwhelming one, to the development 
of some form of banking/brokering service 
established to facilitate water transfer 
where changes of use might be the norm. In 
light of these above quoted cases, it would 
appear that the statutory requirement to 
protect vested rights is a constraint on 
certain transfer schemes, but not a pro-
hibitive constraint. Further, it appears 
that the more "beneficial" the proposed new 
use is, the more burden the State Engineer 
and the Courts will place on the protestor 
to show an impairment. 
I t seems logical to assume that the 
concern for impairment of vested rights is 
more benign when a temporary change is 
proposed as opposed to a permanent change. 
Therefore, the degree to which impairment 
must be determined precisely will usually be 
less for temporary changes. In both types of 
change, however, the State Engineer must make 
an investigation and a finding of no impair-
ment. If there is an impairment, the parties 
may arrive at a form'of compensation whereby 
the State Engineer would permit the transac-
tion to proceed. 
Procedural Factors. While the substan-
tive law does not appear to be significantly 
restrictive in allowing changes in use to 
take place, the procedural encumbrances 
could not be avoided in the operation of a 
banking/brokerage system. Under current law 
all changes of use must have a 1) formal 
applicat ion filed with the St ate Engineer, 
(42) 458 P. 2d 851, 864. While this case is 
limited to an underground water table, the principle 
would seem to apply for all changes from the court's 
view. Indeed, the court directly quoted in support 
of its decision aU. S. Supreme Court case dealing 
wi th sur face wa ters and holding no priori ty ap-
propriator is absolutely entitled to preservation of 
his original stream flow if it becomes "inefficient." 
Schodde v. Twin Falls Land! Water Co., 224 US 107. 
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2) a publication in the media (one publica-
tion for a temporary change or three succes-
sive weeks for a permanent change), 3) a 
30-day protest period, and 4) the approval 
or rejection of the application by the State 
Engineer. At the absolute minimum, this 
process requires 60 days and (because Of the 
inherent delays), at least 90 days should be 
considered the minimum. One of the potential 
advantages of a banking/brokering system 
would be its ability to expedite water rights 
transactions. However, the processing time 
for examining the third party consequences of 
that transaction is largely set by law. 
Therefore, it may be desirable ultimately to 
reexamine the statutory and procedural 
elements which govern water right transfers 
and changes in use with reference to whether 
revision would facilitate a banking/brokerage 
operation without loss of public awareness 
and opportunity to be heard. A possibility 
may be to utilize the "temporary change" 
procedure which allows a change use to 
proceed without delay while necessary sup-
porting data and evaluations can be thorough-
ly conducted. Unless the bank ing/broker ing 
system were incorporated into the State 
Engineer function, that agency would be leery 
of delegating authority to the bank for 
making provisional transfers. Even though 
third party impacts seem clear and un-
disputed, it is not uncommon for some un-
foreseen challenge to crop up. Therefore, 
any separate procedure for provisional 
approval of a transfer under banking/broker-
i ng auspices would be questionable as a 
device to speed the transfer process. 
Public Interest and Water 
Quality Factors 
Certain other statutory conditions 
pertain to any appropriation of a water 
right and apply generally to water transfers. 
Consequently, they deserve mention as poten-
t ial constraints applicable to the bank ing/ 
brokerage concept. For example, water trans-
fers and changes in use must consider public 
desirability and concern. Also it is be-
coming increasingly important to consider the 
quality related aspects of any water right 
transfer. Any "conditioning" costs as-
sociated with the transfer because of water 
quality requirements may certainly affect 
the freedom to barter as well as influencing 
the negotiated price of a water right. 
V. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Water OWnership Hierarchy 
In addition to the complication that the 
inhomogeneity of uses introduces to the water 
transfer process, there is a kind of institu-
tional variation among water owning entities 
which creates some significant implications 
for the water banking concept. 
Water rights are awarded to many dif-
ferent kinds of entities (see page 6) ranging 
from individuals, groups of individuals, 
cities and towns, various kinds of districts, 
agencies of local, state, and federal govern-
ments, etc. The geographic domain of the 
entity to which a water right pertains 
may vary from less than 1 acre to several 
counties. There is also great variation in 
the range of uses permitted under a particu-
lar water right award. 
Water rights of an individual are quite 
specific in terms of the nature, place, 
timing, and amount of use. This same degree 
of precision commonly applies to the whole of 
the water right of a single purpose organiza-
tion such as a mutual irrigation company. On 
the other hand, water rights owned by munici-
palities or water conservancy districts 
allow a multitude of uses leaving the agent 
owner free to make and to manage the in-
d ividual allocations for water use between 
and among constituents over time. Where 
water rights vary so greatly in terms of 
geographic extent, allowable uses, and the 
size, character, and operating latitude of 
the appropriator, it is clear that the 
resolution with which the State Engineer sees 
third party impacts to a particular water 
transfer differs vastly from one water right 
to another. Where the water right is issued 
to an entity acting as an agent for a large 
set of water users, that agent becomes the 
referee to individual user allocations 
and water transfers between and among users 
making up its constituency. So long as these 
impacts are presumed to be "internal" to the 
corporate water right, the State Engineer, 
who is concerned about impacts between 
rights, does not normally get involved. 
In mutual irrigation companies, the 
water right is (in effect) approportioned to 
i ndi vidual ownership through issuance of 
water stock representing proportionate shares 
of the collective water assets. Thus, the 
equity interests, represented by certificates 
of water stock, can be bought and sold for 
uses and places consistent with the company 
charter without requiring State Engineer 
approval. However, where sales represent a 
physical transfer of water to different uses 
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and places whereby the likelihood of a third 
party impact is increased, objections may be 
raised requiring the State Engineer to 
determine whether or not the proposed trans-
fer is appropriate. 
Municipal water utilities do not iden-
tify equity interests in their water rights 
to customers. The emphasis is on providing a 
safe, dependable water service much in the 
manner of an electrical utility. Pro-rata 
ownership of the water right is not recog-
nized. Considerations for water transfer or 
exchange can only take place at the municipal 
government level. Certain constitutional 
restrictions apply to municipal water right 
transfers which are discussed in Chapter 
IV of this report. 
Water Conservancy Districts represent 
large and important change agents in water 
development and distribution. As with 
municipalities, their water rights generally 
involve substantial "blocks" of water which 
can, in turn, be allocated under contractual 
arrangements to a variety of specific uses. 
Districts may be wholesalers or retailers of 
water developed under the blanket (block) 
water right. Subscribers of district 
water do not acquire a water right per se. 
Rather, . they obtain a firm commitment to 
provide an agreed upon amount of water at an 
agreed upon price for some specific period of 
time. Water Conservancy Districts have 
wide latitude in how they may acquire, 
develop, and manage water. 
The state or an agency of the federal 
government may acquire block water rights in 
anticipation of projects which may take many 
years to construct. Consequently, they are. 
frequently given special consideration in 
satisfying due diligence ~equirements. 
(Ultimate reallocation of these state or 
federal agency water rights to some managment 
agency may constitute some prescription of 
the State Engineer's function.) The point to 
be made here, however, is that there are a 
variety. of institutional peculiarities which 
enshroud a water right which may place 
conditions on the ease of transfer of 
water and also the extent to which ~he 
proposed transfer requires State Engineer 
endorsement and oversight. Certain "internal" 
transfers and allocations take place continu-
ally whose social and economic impacts are 
very substantial yet do not require State 
Engineer tests of third party impact and 
public interest. This represents a kind of 
inconsistency that the bank would have to 
recognize and deal with until and unless leg-
islative changes ironed out the variations. 
Institutional Constraints to 
Water Marketing 
Water institutions of various kinds are 
the mechanisms for transforming the physical 
and economic potentials into realities. 
Organized to perform specific functions or to 
achieve particular goals, institutions 
make the decisions, the commitments, and take 
the actions which result in the ultimate 
regulation, delivery, distribution, and 
disposal of water in accordance with speci-
fied needs. If poorly organized, staffed, 
supervised and managed; or, if inadequately 
coordinated and integrated with companion 
institutions; the effectiveness with which 
objectives are accomplished may be con-
strained. Any such limitations or impedi-
ments tend to reduce the value of water 
rights and retard free movement according to 
market forces. Institutional factors may 
work to impede or facilitate the water right 
transfer process, and hence, the brokerage 
operation. 
Reference has already been made to the 
implications of institutional variations 
among water owning entities on water right 
transfers. Municipalities, Water Conservancy 
Districts, Special Improvement Districts, and 
all the rest have statutory restrictions 
limiting the geographic areas they can serve 
and their freedom to transfer, exchange, or 
otherwise manage their water rights. In-
stitutions also have a variety of con-
tractural commitments and indebtedness which 
may become a lien upon water rights and thus 
restrict their movement in a water market. 
For example, a water conservancy district 
having long term obligatory contracts of 
repayment with the federal government 
could only participate in a water marketing 
activity so long as transactions could be 
made compatible with contractural obliga-
tions. In certain cases, the contractual 
obligations will be significant barriers 
to water market transfers. In other words, 
if a market exists for the water right 
without any such contractual obligations but 
not with them, then the logical conclusion is 
that these encumbrances are in fact insti-
tutional constraints the market potential 
and thus, the operation of a water bankIng 
system. Ancillary to contractual arrange-
ments are the loan or bond repayment ar-
rangements which likewise must be con-
sidered as limiting the water market poten-
tial in certain cases. The situation is 
somewhat analogous to the real estate market 
wherein the mortgage obligations and condi-
tions directly affect the marketability of a 
parcel of land. There is some difference., 
however, in that the obligations in the water 
resource are usually group obligations 
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encumbering many different water rights 
and holders. 
In contrast to the kinds of formal 
constraints noted above, there are some 
informal constraints which are more difficult 
to identify and to assess in terms of impact 
on the water banking potential. A viable 
and successful bank must have an open nego-
tiation atmosphere within which to operate. 
A pure open negotiation process is one 
in which all potential participants agree 
upon a uniform criteria for assigning values 
to the resource. In the water world, how-
ever, value perceptions are sometimes 
clouded with cultural and psychological 
biases. The perception of water as the 
"lifeblood" of an area may cause a distortion 
of the theoretical marginal value of a water 
supply. Or, if water is considered in the 
context of a "family heirloom" the market 
potential may be constrained accordingly. 
This potential for distortion is com-
pounded by the long existence of many inde-
pendent water management entities throughout 
the state and which exhibit a reluctance to 
relinquish any vested institutional inter-
ests. Many mutual water companies, irrigation 
companies, municipalities, etc., view the 
water market singularly from an internal 
perspective. Sometimes these perceptions 
include a strong desire to maintain the 
existence of an organizational and opera-
tional structure notwithstanding any economic 
inefficiencies which might develop over time. 
Willingness to buy or sell water within 
these entities· can be limited, and at times 
eliminated by these cultural per.ceptions 
and biases. This conclusion is not an 
argument to remove these institutions. 
It is to be considered only as an observed 
potential institutional constraint on a 
market under a banking system. These barriers 
to free negotiation and interchange could 
exist both between two potential buyers, 
between two potential sellers, or between a 
buyer and seller. 
Historically, the manner of organization 
and original intent of water management 
institutions have a strong influence on the 
disposition of the membership and managing 
authorities. Th is background can create an 
institutional inertia favoring or disfavoring 
certain types of water transactions. The 
degree to which these dispositions are 
compatible with the potential unencumbered 
market will determine the degree to which 
these institutions would be a constraint on a 
water banking system. 
VI. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CREATION 
OF A WATER BANKING/BROKERING SERVICE 
The desirability of establishing a water 
banking/brokering service is in large measure 
determined by comparing the benefits of such 
an operation with the associated expenses. 
Could the information and expertise supplied 
by a banking/brokering entity significantly 
reduce the time and expense involved in 
negotiating and completing a water right 
transfer? What is the level of activity in 
water rights transactions in Utah? Would the 
existence of a centralized banking/brokering 
service actually stimulate more water market-
ing activity? These are some of the ques-
tions addressed in this section. 
Market Information 
The price attached to a water right 
reflects the social value of that right to 
the extent that the water market operates 
efficiently. The more information available, 
the more effectively and efficiently the 
market will function. Sellers need to know 
the prices that are being offered for water 
rights. Buyers need to know what it will 
cost to acquire and adapt a given supply to a 
different use. The capabi li ty to assemble 
and analyze all the information which both 
buyers and sellers would need in order to 
arrive at an appropriate selling price would 
be a principal raison d'etre of a water bank. 
The presumption of the rational economic 
actor is based on his possession of adequate 
information and the use of that information 
in the pursuit of his self interest. (1) 
The value of a water right varies greatly 
with its year to year or seasonal certainty, 
its location, its quality, and the complexity 
and costs of needed facilities and management 
measures to place it in use. The buyer of a 
water right needs more information than the 
se11er--particu1ar1y about costs to "condi-
t ion" any given supply to make its quantity, 
quality, and timing characteristics conform 
to the requirements of the "new" use. 
The total cost of purchasing water is 
more than the cost of acquiring the water 
right at its current site of use. Additional 
costs are incurred to relocate or convey the 
water to the new points of use; possible 
treatment to bring existing quality to the 
desired level of quality; possible compensa-
tion to damaged third parties; and costs 
(l}For a general discussion on price theory 
and social values see Friedman (I962) Price 'lbeory 
1962, Aldine Publishing Co. Chicago or Ferguson and 
Maurice (19 ) Microeconomic Theory. 
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(generally for storage facilities) to alter 
the timing of availability of the old point 
of use to times of need at the new point of 
use. 
These added costs are only justified 
when the potential buyer can obtain com-
mensurate returns. (2) Since these "condi-
tioning" costs get capitalized into the value 
of the water right, a steady upgrading 
in value of a water right takes place over 
time. New uses which can justify paying 
higher prices, commonly look to enterprises 
depending on low cost water (I.e. ap,ri-
culture) for their supply. To the 'raw 
water" costs at the site of current use are 
added the "conditioning" costs to obtain the 
characteristics needed for the new use. 
Professional assistance in evaluating the 
total costs of optional water supply sources 
could be a valuable service to some prospec-
tive buyers. Providing not only a cen-
tralized listing of available water rights 
but also providing the capability to appraise 
the physical and legal certainty of a right 
and to analyze the needed conditioning 
requirements for alternate transfer schemes 
would gr.eat1y improve the decision calculus 
of a potential buyer. For example, there 
seems to be a decided shortage of information 
about water marketing potential growing out 
of the urbanization process. Farmers whose 
agricultural lands have been subdivided are 
often unaware of possibilities converting 
irrigation water to urban supplies (either 
potable or nonpotab1e components). Sub-
division developers commonly seek a potable 
supply derived from an entirely different 
water right (perhaps an organization owning 
and marketing water for domestic service). 
Thus nonoptima1 allocations of water may be 
occurring because of the lack of market 
information that could be provided through 
a brokering service established to bridge 
that information gap. 
Current Levels of Water 
Transfer Activity 
Despite informational deficienc~es, 
there is considerable act ivi ty in the water 
rights market. An indication of the level of 
this activity is given by the data comprising 
Table 2. The number of applications processed 
(2}see Herfindahl and Kneese, Economic Theory 
of Natural Resources, for a discussion of production 
and marginal cost analysis. 
by the State Engineer to appropriate, change 
use, and exchange water rights indicates that 
individuals are finding new uses that 
require new supplies and that established 
supplies (rights) are being moved from their 
current uses to presumably higher valued 
uses. The market is workin.A through the 
framework established by law.(j) 
The information in Table 2 is, however, 
incomplete. It does not show how many more 
transfers might have taken place if the 
holders of the water rights had known of 
potential buyers for their right and had 
general market information that would have 
provided the incentive to place their right 
into higher valued uses (permanently, 
through sale, or temporarily, through lease). 
Nor does the information show whether the 
actual transfers represent the best match of 
(3}This may be in contradiction to the California 
experience where it is reported that owners "seldom 
transfer their waters" and that "water transfers 
almost never occur in years of normal precipitation" 
(Sotorius et al.). 
Table 2. Applications received, processed, and 
Year 1968 1969 
Applications received: 
Applications to Appropriate 534 588 
Applications to Change 283 317 
Application to Exchange 29 53 
Application for Extension of 
Time to Resume Use 7 13 
Application to Clean, Deepen, 
Repair & Replace 180 127 
Total Applications Received 1033 1098 
Action Taken on Application: 
Applications Advertised 873 909 
Protested Application Hearings 155 114 
Applications Approved 845 983 
Applications Rejected 111 102 
Extension of Time Requests 1274 1256 
Advertised Extension Requests 56 93 
Extension Request Hearings 1274 253 
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potentially usable rights to new demands. 
The information shown in Table 2 does not 
constitute a market analysis, by any means, 
but it gives some indication of the level of 
activity in water use changes. 
It is not the province of the State 
Engineer's Office to determine that transfers 
of rights will result in greatest social 
utility. The State Engineer considers social 
utility but does not identify and evaluate 
alternatives and then allow only that trans-
fer option where social utility is believed 
to be maximized. The State Engineer acts in 
the capacity of an impartial judge in evalu-
ating whether a change use request should be 
allowed. To encourage or discourage the 
level and character of transaction activity 
might possibly compromise that position of 
impartiality. 
Economic Feasibility of a Water 
Rights Banking Service 
As has been previously mentioned, the 
principal justification for the establishment 
of a water banking service is based on the 
social benefits of the service exceeding the 
social costs. These social costs and bene-
action taken. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
599 659 795 1095 1167 
387 332 407 477 473 
36 64 112 129 113 
6 8 21 11 8 
102 74 149 161 129 
1130 1137 1484 1873 1890 
900 987 1327 1797 1707 
94 192 198 218 210 
961 956 1020 1756 1495 
89 41 84 36 79 
1104 1380 1048 1174 982 
52 125 58 94 85 
178 313 113 134 101 
fits have both public and private aspects. 
Those costs and benefits which accrue to 
current water right holders or to individuals 
placing water rights into private uses 
are rightly termed private. Additionally, 
because of the many external effects gener-
ated from the private use of the water 
resource, the public also receives costs and 
benefits without directly utiliz,ing the 
water resource. 
A cost-benefit analysis of the proposed 
water banking service would be difficult to 
perform because of the problem of estimating 
the net efficiency increase made possible 
through a better matching of water supplies 
to water uses. The impact of the water bank 
would probably not be measured solely by the 
increase in the number of water rights 
transfers; it would, rather, be in the 
increased hydrologic and economic efficiency 
of transfers made under conditions of im-
proved information. This makes it addition-
ally difficult to forecast costs and benefits 
throughout the entire social fabric. Thus, 
only a limited discussion will be attempted 
here. 
Costs 
The cost of creating and operating the 
water rights banking service depends pri-
marily on the extent of the services r.rovided 
by the bank. A bank offering only a 'listing 
and bid" service would have considerably 
lower overhead than one offering the services 
of a professional investigative staff. 
Nevertheless, the minimum cost would include 
overhead for office and office supplies, 
expense ac.counts for advertising and travel, 
and salaries for the manager and other 
office personnel. 
The manager must be a capable individual 
(perhaps specially trained in the engineer-
i ng, economic, and institutional aspects of 
water management), since his personal knowl-
edge of the water rights activity in the 
region would ultimately be a valuable market-
able good. He becomes the key figure in the 
banking operation. Middle management and 
professional talent would likely be drawn 
from either the private sector or from 
the upper echelons of other governmental: 
agenci es. 
Benefits 
The benefits of the water broker ing 
operation would accrue primarily to the 
immediate buyers and sellers. Water rights 
would move from lower valued uses to higher 
valued uses which generally serves the public 
interest. Sellers would benefit by receiving 
more from their water than they would 
receive by keeping that water in their own 
production. 
The buying market for water rights would 
benef i t by having an increased market of 
suppliers from which to choose the least cost 
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option for their own particular needs, and 
reduced acquisition costs. 
Net benefits generated as a result of 
the water banking/brokering service through 
allowing the purchasers least cost option 
selection is, again, difficult to assess. 
The net benefit would be the difference 
between what the purchaser might have paid in 
the absence of the bank and what the pur-
chaser did pay as a result of water banking! 
brokering operation. This varies from 
transaction to transaction and becomes 
often a function of the competitive market 
effect. Yet, the aggregate of these price 
differences becomes a net benefit of the 
water brokering operation. 
Through the accumulation of very spe-
cialized information and council of an expert 
staff, there would be increased efficiency in 
the operation of the water market because of 
the reduction of informational search costs 
by individuals. For example, an individual 
attempting to acquire rights in a given area 
currently must advertise, make many personal 
inquiries, or commission others to seek out 
willing sellers. A limited knowledge of the 
water availability and the water right 
transfer process would probably limit search 
to the immediate area of intended use, thus 
ignoring potential supplies from other 
feasible transfer sources. Yet evaluation of 
multi-party exchanges or other potentials may 
result in a more satisfactory solution to the 
acquisition problem. Once the search has 
been completed and a seller found, it is 
common to obtain legal advice about the 
status of the water right and the appro-
priateness of any transfer documents. If the 
bank, by virtue of its accumulation of 
information about water rights, were able to 
provide this kind of examination and title 
verification to the potential purchaser at 
less than the customary cost, then the 
benefits generated by the banking/brokerage 
operation would be significant. Any foregone 
income to the legal profession as a result of 
this alternate service must, however, be 
counted as a social cost of implementing the 
banking service. 
In addition to the private benefits, 
the public receives benefits as the water 
rights market operates more freely to place 
water into uses on which society places a 
higher value. In many cases, there is a 
multiplier effect as water availability paves 
the way for increased production or recre-
ational opportunity. Private enterprise 
generates public benefits through tax reve-
nues, employment, maintenance of a certain 
standard of living through economic security, 
and other positive external effects. However, 
the tracing of these benefit linkages from 
greater water use effectiveness resulting 
from changes in use is beyond the scope of 
this report. 
Financial Feasibility of a Water 
Rights Banking Service 
There exist three options in the finan-
cing of a water rights banking service. 
First, there is the self-supporting banking/ 
brokering option. Under this approach, the 
users of the service would pay the costs of 
the bank's operation. There would be no 
outside funding, taxing capacity, or govern-
mental appropriation. Among the arguments 
for a self-supporting operation are: 1) 
the benefits of such a banking service are 
primarily private and should be paid for by 
those who receive the benefits; and 2) 
if the business generated becomes insuf-
ficient to sustain its operation it would not 
continue as an unessential entity maintained 
at public expense. By adhering to a "user-
pays" approach, if the bank received enough 
income through transfer activity it would 
continue to operate; if not, it would be 
discontinued as unnecessary. A seeming 
lack of interest by private "water con-
sultants" at the present time may reflect 
either a perceived lack of market potential 
or a "high risk" element due to inadequate 
information. This "high risk" activity would 
not compete well with other less risky 
investments of the entrepreneurs time and 
resources. 
The data from Table 2 on water rights 
change use applications provide some indica-
t ion of the changes going on in water 
rights. However, many individual transfers 
and changes take place within the corporate 
water right which would not be visible to the 
State Engineer. Some of these transactions 
could seek assistance through a water broker-
ing service if one were available. While the 
total activity in water rights exchanges 
is not indicated by the statistics in the 
Office of the State Engineer, it must be 
recognized that not all water rights transac-
t ions would seek the aid of a broker. Just 
as with real estate transactions, some 
buyers and sellers would prefer to work out 
the transfer arrangements and instruments 
privately. A crude indication of brokering 
potential might be obtained by presuming that 
the 130 change applications per year reported 
in the 1972-73 period for the Jordan River 
region might be a reasonable estimate of 
trans act ions funneled through a water bank 
servicing that region. If there were 130 
transactions per year with an average cost to 
the buying and selling parties of $150.00 
each, this would represent income to the bank 
of $39,000 from the Jordan River region. 
Quite likely, this would represent a marginal 
level of income to offset the expenses of 
operating the banking/brokering service. 
Also, it must be presumed that utilization of 
the service would build gradually over a 
period of years so that self-sufficiency 
could not be realistically expected over-
night. 
A second approach to the funding of the 
water rights banking service would be to 
support it with public funding. The bank 
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would, in fact, become an agency of the state 
government and would be funded accordi ngly. 
This approach assumes that so many of the 
benefits of efficient water use are public in 
nature and distributed in general but non-
specific ways such that the public might 
properly subsidize the buyers and sellers in 
order to generate these benefits. In this 
case, private benefits would merely be a 
convenient by-product of the public benefits 
so generated. 
A third approach to the funding question 
is a combination of the first two; that is, 
a mixed source of funding. Private parties 
paying for some portion of the benefits that 
they receive as a result of the bank's 
operation, and a public compensation to the 
bank on behalf of the general public for the 
public benefits received as a result of the 
banking operation. In the first two ap-
proaches, there is no need to separate and 
quantify the public and private benefits. 
All are considered either completely public 
or completely private for financing purposes. 
Yet, in terms of distribution of social costs 
and benefits and private costs and benefits 
of the water banking service, the mixed 
support may be most equitable. 
The drawback of having an individual pay 
a fee to the bank based on benefits received 
from the transaction is in the determina-
tion of those benefits and the added costs 
entailed in the administration of the fee. 
There are of course, a variety of fee op-
tions. The bank could assess a fee based on 
any or all of the following criteria: 
1. Volume of water transferred. 
2. Flow rate of water transferred. 
3. Costs incurred in investigating and 
facilitiating transfer. 
4. Value of water in past or new use. 
5. Percentage of selling price. 
As to whether the buyer or seller should 
be required to pay the necessary fee, it 
might be desirable to leave this cost alloca-
tion to the parties involved as part of the 
price negotiations. Such an approach is 
found in the real estate markets. In those 
markets, the participants to a transaction 
negotiate nearly all aspects of the transac-
tion, including the basic costs of closing 
the transaction. The result is an allocation 
of costs based on mutual agreement rather 
Fhan arbitrary assignment. 
In summary, the decision concerning the 
level of public financing of the water 
bank ing service should be based on an eco-
nomic analysis which would trace some of the 
public benefit multiplier linkages. It is 
difficult to define what factors are relevant 
in determining public benefits and hence 
public obligations. Some might see a public 
benefit in the same manner that the public 
benefits from the increased productivity of a 
new business concern or the efficient 
allocation of capital in the securities 
market, both of which receive some form of 
indirect public subsidy through the taxing 
structure. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to 
proceed with a legitimate economic analysis 
of the proposed water rights banking service 
until more information is developed concern-
ing its role and structure of organization. 
Even then, there is no way to identify and 
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q uant ify a demand schedule for the services 
proposed. This chapter has merely served to 
identify some of the considerations of an 
economic and financial nature that might 
accompany the creation and operation of 
a water bank. Such considerations should 
receive extensive discussion and analysis 
before being used as a basis for establishing 
a water rights banking service. 
VI I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
1. The evident and predicted rapid 
changes in the kind, location, and level of 
economic activity in Utah will result in 
increasingly active markets for water 
rights transfers. The urbanization process 
along with the establishment of a variety of 
large new enterprises will foster new water 
use patterns and the need to work out water 
rights transfers and exchanges. Facilitating 
water rights transfers, especially those in-
volving users unfamiliar with availabilities 
and the complexities of transferring water 
equities, will be an important need. 
2. A water banking/brokering system, 
could potentially provide a centralized and 
specialized source of information about water 
availability and water needs. A state of 
individuals having technical understanding of 
the hydrologic, economic, and legal impacts 
and economic externalities that accompany 
changes in water use, could be effective in 
negotiating cost-effective and resource 
efficient matchups of buyers and sellers of 
water. The bank/brokerage may provide any or 
all of the following: 
a) A listing or registry of water 
rights for sale or lease, the 
location of those rights, the asking 
price, and the physical character-
istics of the entitlement available 
to the public market. 
b) A registry of potential purchasers 
of water rights shares or lease-
holds, the use intended, the 
quantity, quality, and regimen 
requirements, and the location of 
proposed use. 
c) Information about local water 
institutions, their supply avail-
abilities, their service areas, 
storage and distribution facilities, 
and potentials for participation 
or involvement in accomplishing 
specific transfer options. 
d) Analysis of the "conditionins" 
implications and constraints In 
transferring a particular right from 
present use to new locations and use 
situations. 
e) Clarification and possibly certi-
fication of legal status and title 
of water rights of interest to 
prospective buyers. 
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A low risk approach to initiating 
a banking/brokering service may be to begin 
wi th a minimum level of service and admin-
istrative structure and expand services 
and capability as justifiable. For example, 
three levels of banking/brokering services 
together with corresponding administrative 
requirements are shown in Table 3. It 
may be wise to initiate the service at a 
minimum level of investment risk and expand 
services in logical phases as justified by 
experience. 
3. There are no constitutional, 
statutory, or regulative elements in Utah 
water administration that would seriously 
cripple or stifle the operation of water 
banking/brokering systems in Utah. Although 
municipalities and water conservancy dis-
tricts would not be able to dispose of water 
rights outside their jurisdiction, they now 
commonly contract wi th outs ide users for 
delivery of water and participate in the 
lease or rental market with supplies for 
which they have no immediate use while 
awaiting increased demands of continued 
growth. However, institutional peculiarities 
and encumbrances may create differing in-
fluences on the ease of efficiency of trans-
fer of water and also the extent to which a 
proposed transfer requires the approval of 
the State Engineer. Differences in debt 
status and contract ural commitments asso-
ciated with specific water holding entities 
may limit the market potential of particular 
water equities. 
4. Procedural requirements pertaining 
to changes in water use, and growing out of 
st~tutory directives, pretty well dictate 
the minimum time frame within which a water 
rights transfer can take place. Those ele-
ments of the transfer process that require 
the acquisition and dissemination of infor-
mation among parties to the transfer, and 
those relat ing to the preparation and pro-
cessing of the various transfer instruments 
could be expedited through services the water 
bank/broker could provide. However, that 
part of the procedural process that pertains 
to the advising of parties that might be 
indirectly effected by the. contemplated 
transfer, and provides for the registry and 
hearing of protests to the proposed transfer, 
would be outside the control of the banker/ 
broker. Thus a brok.er service could do 
nothing to shorten that portion of the 
transaction time critical path pertaining to 
third party inputs. Compression of the time 
path for completing a water rights transac-
tion could only be achieved through legisla-
t ive and procedural changes. Such changes 
would need careful evaluation before adoption 
to make certain that important public safe-
guards are not compromised. 
5. The protection of third party 
interests to any water rights transaction is 
a central consideration in administrative 
procedures pertaining to water rights trans-
fers and changes of use. Thus, water 
rights transactions arranged by a water 
bank/brokering service would be subject to 
third party impact tests performed to the 
State Engineer's satisfaction by the banking 
system or by the State Engineer, himself. 
study's criterion for providing a general 
water brokerage service. In terms of present 
organizational structure (including regional 
offices), familiarity with the mechanics and 
legal reqUirements of water rights transfers 
and changes of use, professional qualifica-
tions of present personnel, and ready access 
to needed information, the Water Rights 
Division of the Department of Natural Re-
sources appears to be well qualified to 
assume the water banking/brokering function. 
Recommendations 
6. Many existing water organizations 
1. Th is study has revealed no major 
legal, institutional, or other constraints to 
the conceptual feasibility of operating a 
water banking/brokering service in Utah at 
least for certain markets and areas. On a 
comparative and normative basis, two organi-
zations, one public, the other private, have 
been identified as best suited to administer 
such a program if initiated. It is recom-
mended that these two organizations now be 
examined in sufficient detail to confirm or 
counter this tentative conclusion. How well 
a banking/brokering system could be in-
corporated or adapted to either of these 
organizations should be examined with very 
are engaging in de facto water banking/ 
brokering in one form or another generally 
within rather restricted geographic domains. 
Of the array of water organizations and 
institutions operating in Utah which might 
operate such a system on an integrated 
statewide bas is, the Of fice of the State 
Engineer (public) and the Utah Water Users 
Association (private) appear to best meet the 
Table 3. Summary of water brokering and banking functions. a 
Function Levels 
LEVEL I 
Centralized Listing Service of 
sale and rental offers and 
purchase requests 
LEVEL II 
Solicitation of sales and pur-
chase offers and dissemination 
of collected information to 
selected agencies, water user 
groups, industrial promotion 
agencies and other parties; 
assist and advise in identifi-
cation of water right record 
status and character, priority 
of right to other rights (not 
a legal opinion). 
LEVEL III 
Preliminary identification of 
third party impacts of transfer 
or exchange and survey of 
mitigation or compensatory 
schemes for resolving transfer 
problems; preliminary analysis 
of water transfer conditioning 
costs; assemble and disaggretate 
"packages" of water rights to 
meet the needs of large and 
small users. 
Administrative Requirements 
Clerical/Non-technical 
Clerical/Managerial with knowledge of 
local water conditions, information 
dissemination procedures, background/ 
experience in water related adminis-
tration procedures, and familiarity 
with Utah system of water rights 
management to assist with buyer and 
seller negotiations. 
Policy determined by an indepen-. 
dent and disinterested board to 
insure public accountability. 
Clerical/Managerial/Professional 
providing capability in hydrology, 
hydraulic design, law, economics, and 
·financial analysis with regional or 
statewide support staff possessing 
detailed knowledge of user needs and 
potential supply sources and ability 
to organize and coordinate large 
scale information exchanges between 
negotiating parties; experience in 
evaluation of water rights transfer 
impacts. Policy determined through 
a disinterested board to insure 
public accountability. 
Other Considerations 
Contact and negotiation at initiative 
of potential buyers and sellers 
Broker fees established by agreement; 
status identification according to 
State Engineer Determinations, 
Judicial Decrees, Adjudications, 
supplemented by correct right holder 
records and subject to the interpre-
tation of State Engineer. 
All transfer or exchange arrangements 
would still require State Engineer 
approval, third right of 
protest, and right appeal by all 
parties; services made available 
would be optional to, or suppleme~tal 
to, private professional services. 
Work with water rights "packages" 
would be offered on an "as needed" 
basis to enhance competitive market 
forces through improved information 
availability to all ~oncerned parties. 
aAII activities subject to the requirements and limitations of Title 73 U.C.A. 
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specific reference to such factors as basic 
mission, operational mode, operating poli-
cies, organizational structure, fiscal and 
budgetary implications, and the public 
distribution of costs and benefits associated 
with the service. 
1. If the Office of the State Engineer 
assumes the management of such a system, 
there would probably be some necessary 
statutory and resulting organizational 
changes in the office. Generally, these 
changes should clearly segregate the current 
adjudicatory functions and the banking/ 
brokerage functions. This segregation would 
mi nimi ze the potent ial for conflicts of 
interest within the Office. 
2. Should a decision be made to imple-
ment a banking/brokering service, it is 
recommended that, initially, the operation 
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give emphasis to the brokering role. This is 
the most readily justifiable component. In 
addition, brokering is not a major departure 
from current administrative practices. 
Decision to add the banking dimension could 
be guided by experience without risking 
significant up front resources in establish-
ing a more comprehensive set of services. 
3. I f one or the other of the above 
organizations desires to initiate the bank-
ing/brokering service, it is recommended that 
some initial financial support funds be 
requested from agencies such as the Office of 
Water Research and Technology, or the Nation-
al Science Fo~ndation, who have incentive 
programs for trying out or demonstrating the 
worth of implementing innovative techniques 
for improving capability to manage water 
resources. 
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